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ABSTRACT 
This thesis analyzes major aspects of Sino-Russian relations during the first decade of the 
twenty-first century.  It has two main objectives. First, it provides a more detailed 
understanding of Sino-Russian relations as they pertain to the dynamics affecting the 
relationship in the Russian Far East (RFE), the formation and evolution of the Shanghai 
Cooperation Organization (SCO), and Sino-Russian trends and dynamics regarding arms 
sales.  This endeavor is accomplished by a detailed historical analysis of the background 
and developments over the past decade as they relate to each subject area.   
In addition, relevant examples or cases have been provided to amplify the 
analytical value in each area.  This historical analysis will assist with constructing the 
second, more important objective of this research: To identify the general themes and 
trends that permeate each aspect of Sino-Russian interactions analyzed in order to 
decipher the substance of the relationship, and how it is maintained, under the current 
state of affairs.  Identifying these will allow for a more cogent projection of short-  and 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. RECENT HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
The People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the Russian Federation (RF) share a 
tumultuous history of relations over the second half of the twentieth century.  The 
relationship that developed after 1949 between the People’s Republic of China and the 
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) was built on similar ideologies, shared 
security concerns, and congruent geopolitical views of the international landscape.  Its 
gradual erosion during the 1950s was the result of ideological differences, diverging 
security concerns, economic problems, and a growing competition to influence other 
emerging Third World communist movements.1  This eventual split led in the mid-1960s 
to the militarization of their shared borders and several clashes, especially in the Ussuri 
River region, that had the potential to culminate in a nuclear war.2  The entrenchment of 
these discordant relational dynamics was hastened by the rapprochement in relations 
between the People’s Republic of China and the United States in the early 1970s.  It had 
the effect of shifting the balance of power in Asia, isolating the USSR further, and 
heightening Sino-Soviet tensions within the context of the Cold War.3  
The inherent acrimony that defined Sino-Soviet relations during this period 
continued into the 1980s, but the foundations for a post-Cold War rapprochement were 
beginning to appear.  Moscow and Beijing began a dialogue in 1982 with the intention of 
reducing the decades-long mistrust that permeated every facet of Sino-Soviet relations.4  
Their continued dialogue and the diligent diplomatic work by both states culminated in a 
May 1989 summit between Mikhail Gorbachev and Deng Xiaoping in Beijing, at which 
party-to-party ties between the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) and the 
 
1 Library of Congress, Federal Research Division, China: A Country Study, June 1987 (accessed 
February 27, 2010); available from http://countrystudies.us/china/. 
2 James C. Moltz, “Regional Tensions in the Russo–Chinese Rapprochement,” Asian Survey 35, no. 6 
(1995): 514. 
3 Library of Congress, China: A Country Study. 
4 Sherman Garnett, “Challenges of the Sino–Russian Strategic Partnership,” The Washington 
Quarterly 24, no. 4 (2001): 41.   
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Communist Party of China (CCP) were restored, which reestablished normal bilateral 
relations.  In addition, it produced an agreement to commence talks centering on the 
demilitarization of the Sino-Soviet border.   
The new foundation of the Sino-Soviet relationship was actually constructed 
around three Soviet concessions made in the years preceding the summit.  The three 
concessions—called by Beijing the “three obstacles” to normal relations—were for the 
Red Army to begin withdrawing its forces from Afghanistan, to significantly reduce the 
Soviet military imprint in the Far East, and to stop providing assistance to the Socialist 
Republic of Vietnam (SRV) in Cambodia.  The Chinese had held firm since the 1970s 
that any future improvement of bilateral relations would occur only if these three 
conditions were met.   
The Soviets, under Gorbachev, began to enact these concessions and, before the 
withdrawal of their forces from Afghanistan by 1989, began to reduce their military 
imprint in Mongolia and the Russian Far East (RFE).5  For example, they removed two 
of four Red Army divisions from Mongolia in early 1987, before the Geneva Accord on 
Afghanistan.  In addition, Soviet pressure on Hanoi led to the 1988 Vietnamese 
agreement on withdrawing from Cambodia.  Soviet actions demonstrated that it was 
serious about rapprochement with Beijing. 
These events, combined with the end of the Cold War, demonstrated that the 
1990s would continue to move Sino-Russian relations in new directions.  Arms sales 
increased dramatically and a five-year defense cooperation agreement was signed in 
1993.  By 1996, an agreement from both sides that the Sino-Russian relationship was 
developing into a “strategic partnership” was publicly acknowledged for the first time.6  
Vladimir Putin’s arrival in office on December 31, 1999, with his goal of reasserting 
 
5 Moltz, “Regional Tensions,” 516. 
6 Library of Congress, Federal Research Division, Russia: A Country Study, May 1996 (accessed 
February 27, 2010); available from  http://countrystudies.us/russia/. 
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central control over the state and its vast energy resources, would continue to push the 
Sino-Russian relationship into new directions as the twenty-first century unfolded.7 
B. IMPORTANCE 
The Sino-Russian relationship is complex and is replete with divergent views 
across the spectrum of Chinese, Russian, and Western academia and among the relevant 
actors within the relationship itself.  Moscow and Beijing portray the relationship as a 
“strategic partnership” that is predicated on international cooperation.8  Academics in 
Russia and in the West, however, portray it in a much different and often negative light.  
From a Western point of view, the Sino-Russian relationship is generally viewed in more 
unfavorable terms.  It has been portrayed as a new “Axis of Authoritarianism” due to the 
recent Russian resurgence and a general neglect of the region by U.S. foreign policy in 
the recent past.9  Others, such as Bobo Lo, the director of the China and Russia Programs 
Center at the Center for European Reform, has called it a “unbalanced triangle” in terms 
of trilateral Sino-Russian and Sino-U.S. relations and has also referred to it as an “Axis of 
Convenience” built on Sino-Russian rhetoric that centers on partnership and 
cooperation.10   
Understanding the major geopolitical, economic, and security aspects of the Sino-
Russian relationship as they have evolved over the past decade or so is pertinent to 
understanding a dynamic in East Asia that is often overlooked.  The Russian Federation 
remains the world’s largest country, has immense mineral wealth, and still maintains a 
vast nuclear arsenal.11  It also has a strong desire to remain a major player in world 
 
7 Nicklas Norling, “China and Russia: Partners with Tensions,” Policy Perspectives 4, no. 1 (2007): 
36. 
8 Bobo Lo, Axis of Convenience: Moscow, Beijing, and the New Geopolitics (Baltimore: Brookings 
Institution Press, 2008), 1. 
9 Charles E. Ziegler, “Axis of Authoritarianism,” Asian Survey 49, no. 1 (2009): 135. 
10 See Bobo Lo, The Unbalanced Triangle (accessed February 28, 2010); available from 
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/65230/stephen-kotkin/the-unbalanced-triangle. 
11 Russia (accessed July 1, 2010); available from https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/geos/rs.html. 
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affairs.12  Although Russia considers itself a European country in its character and in the 
preponderance of its current interests, geopolitical realities dictate that its Asian 
territories, most notably the Russian Far East, will play an increasingly vital role in 
determining whether its recent resurgence is a long-term reality or another twist and turn 
in its post-Cold War roller coaster ride.  This tumultuous Russian experience has ranged 
from a 1990s “economic and military freefall” to a recent resurgence as a major power 
that began in 2000 under Vladimir Putin.13   
China has the world’s largest population, at close to one-and-a-half billion people, 
and has experienced thirty years of dramatic modernization and economic growth.  It now 
has the world’s second largest economy, remains a capable nuclear power, and continues 
to expand its regional and global presence economically, militarily, and culturally.  A 
major question is: how will China’s continued emergence into a regional and global 
power affect its evolving relationship with a resurgent Russia that still views itself as 
playing a major role in Asian and global affairs?14  In spite of points of divergence, the 
People’s Republic of China and the Russian Federation continue to publicly acknowledge 
the importance of their “strategic partnership” in regional and global affairs. 
The birth of this “strategic partnership” has evoked substantial debate within the 
security arena—and other policy-related fields.15  These debates center on the substance 
of the Sino-Russian relationship, the interests of both states in the maintenance of this 
relationship, and its implications for U.S. policy in Asia.  This thesis focuses on the 
substance of this bilateral relationship and the dynamics involved in its maintenance 
during the first decade of the twenty-first century.  Whatever perspective is adopted in 
analyzing Sino-Russian relations, one fact is easily agreed upon by everyone.  The Sino-
 
12 Eugene B. Rumer, “Mind the Gap: Russian Ambition vs. Russian Reality,” in Strategic Asia 2008–
2009: Challenges and Choices, ed. Ashley J. Tellis, Mercy Kuo, and Andrew Marble (Washington, DC: 
The National Bureau of Asian Research), 195–196. 
13 William C. Wohlforth, “Russia’s Missing Asian Revisionism,” in The United States and Northeast 
Asia, ed. G. John Ikenberry and Chung-in Moon (Lanham, Md: Rowman &Littlefield Publishers, inc., 
2008), 100–109.  
14 Ibid. 
15 Gilbert Rozman, “Russian Foreign Policy in Northeast Asia,” in The International Relations of 
Northeast Asia, ed.  Samuel S. Kim (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publisher, inc., 2004), 206. 
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Russian relationship will have a substantial effect on the future geopolitical, economic 
and security landscape in East Asia.  This reality makes understanding the short- and 
long-term prospects for its continued viability is crucial to understanding the relationship 
between two of Asia’s largest powers.   
Both countries continue to assert themselves in different ways.  An analysis of the 
Sino-Russian relationship’s foundations, its strengths, and its weaknesses will provide an 
important insight into the short- and long-term prospects for this relationship.  It will also 
provide a frame of reference for the possible trajectories of the relationship as the twenty-
first century moves forward.  Due to the myriad of factors that define this relationship, 
this thesis focuses on analyzing three major aspects.  
C. MAJOR ASPECTS OF ANALYSIS 
The three major aspects of this relationship I analyze represent the greater part of 
the positive and negative bilateral contact points in the Sino-Russian relationship during 
the past decade.  They include Sino-Russian interactions in the Russian Far East, 
interactions surrounding the formation and maintenance of the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization (SCO), and dynamics regarding bilateral arms sales.  With regard to these 
three aspects, this thesis provides a relatively standard framework of analysis for each 
section.  First, a brief historical background pertinent to each major aspect provides the 
relevant context necessary to understand how each has evolved over the past decade.  
Second, an analysis of Chinese and Russian interests and interactions is provided in order 
to understand how each state views what is at stake in the context of the overall 
relationship.  Finally, an analysis of the issues and trends within each of these major 
aspects is provided as the proper analytical foundation for ascertaining the overall short- 
and long-term prospects for Sino-Russian relations as the twenty-first century continues. 
Among the three aspects this thesis focuses on, the first—bilateral contacts 
pertaining to the Russian Far East—and the third—Sino-Russian arms sales—require a 
more extensive historical perspective.  The origins of Sino-Russian arms sales goes back 
well into the twentieth century.  In the case of relations in the Russian Far East, the 
origins go back over 350 years.  Choosing these aspects allows for a comprehensive 
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analysis of this relationship that incorporates political, economic, social, security, 
military, and geographical aspects that all have had an effect on the overall dynamics of 
Sino-Russian relations during the past decade and throughout their long history of 
relations. 
Chapter II of this thesis analyzes issues and dynamics concerning the Russian Far 
East over the past decade.  This region is economically underdeveloped, in need of 
reindustrialization, lacks adequate infrastructure, and has several other damaging legacies 
resulting from Soviet policy failures.  These policy failures have continued under the 
Russian Federation and, taken together, inhibit the likely possibility of a quick turnaround 
under current circumstances.16  This reality is due to a plethora of geopolitical, economic, 
social, and cultural problems that have combined to make the Russian Far East an 
underdeveloped region that suffers from what has been termed the “Siberian Curse.”17 
Small-scale Sino-Russian cooperation has occurred in certain areas over the past decade, 
but no major developments have significantly changed the status quo in the region.   
More generally, contestation over borders in this region has long been a problem, 
dating back several hundred years.  During the Cold War, militarization of the border 
areas led to several clashes in 1969.  In the 1990s, most of the eastern and western 
borders were demarcated.  More recently, the final unresolved aspects of border 
demarcation were agreed upon by both parties.  Regardless, even though most of the 
border disputes have been settled at the national level, the Russian Far East continues to 
have problems due to unresolved disputes over aspects concerning the Amur and Ussuri 
River channels at local levels.18  These, combined with the other problems alluded to 
earlier, have had dramatic economic, social, and political effects on a region that needs 
Chinese economic investment, cooperation, and participation in order to survive in the 
long term.  Understanding the interaction of these effects on the overall viability of Sino-
Russian relations will provide another aspect of analysis that is critical.  An analysis of 
 
16 Gilbert Rozman, “Strategic Thinking about the Russian Far East,” Problems of Post-Communism 
55, no. 1 (2008): 47. 
17 Ibid., 37. 
18 Moltz, “Regional Tensions,” 524. 
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the past decade of regional relations will also shed light on whether or not the status quo 
in the Russian Far East is gradually shifting. It also will demonstrate how Russian 
corruption and xenophobia have impeded progress in the region, and it will illustrate 
several other historical legacies that continue to plaque this region of the Russian 
Federation.   
In Chapter III, this thesis addresses the Sino-Russian relationship as it pertains to 
the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in Central Asia.  Central Asia is a region where 
the potential for Sino-Russian cooperation and contention exists simultaneously.  It 
examines the pertinent aspects concerning the establishment of the SCO, its inception and 
evolution over the first decade of the twenty-first century, and how the Sino-Russian 
relationship has been shaped by this multilateral organization and its impact on the 
geopolitics of Central Asia.  The chapter analyzes Chinese and Russian interests and 
interactions regarding the SCO and each state’s decisions regarding its direction and 
utility as a regional organization.  Analyzing these aspects provides insight into how each 
state views its relationship with the other and sees its position in the SCO.  It also 
provides a glimpse into what the Sino-Russian relationship is actually predicated on.  
Finally, Chapter IV assesses trends and interactions in arms sales between China 
and Russia over the past decade.  Arms sales emerged as a significant part of the 
relationship by the late 1990s. Over the past ten years, however, it has seen a gradual 
shift in its dynamics.  Arms sales remain one of the pillars responsible for the Sino-
Russian strategic partnership but it has also been an area of contention at times.  
Congruent interests in the areas of defense cooperation and weapons sales have made 
them one of the most stable elements of the Sino-Russian relationship for both states.  
This thesis therefore analyzes Chinese and Russian interests, interactions, trends, and 
issues to determine what correlations or themes may exist and determine if they aid in 
predicting trends for this relationship in the future. 
The overall purpose of the standardized analytical framework utilized in each of 
these chapters is to provide a consistent analysis of Sino-Russian relations as they 
continue into the second decade of the twenty-first century.  Each one of these areas is an 
ever-changing and multifaceted situation that has the potential to spur either cooperation 
 8
or contention in Sino-Russian relations.  It is important to look at each aspect through the 
same analytical lens in order to draw out the consistent themes or correlations that make 
predicting future trends in Sino-Russian relations valuable as a reference point.    
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II. THE RUSSIAN FAR EAST 
A. BACKGROUND 
The Russian Far East (RFE) has a long and chaotic history.  It is known as a 
demographic melting pot with a wide variety of cultural and social influences that are the 
result of war, tribal migrations, a remote and harsh environment, and, more recently, 
tumultuous state-to-state relations.  These factors make it one of the most interesting 
regions in the world but also one of the most contentious.19   It is a region that, due to 
Sino-Russian geopolitics during the past 350 years, has “continuously expanded and 
contracted” along with the balance of power of these states.20  The amorphous nature of 
the RFE during this time has made it a cause of continuous dispute between Russia and 
China as both have evolved in the international system.  Despite multiple agreements on 
the demarcation of the borders and disputed territories in and around the region, the RFE 
continues to “encapsulate in the most direct sense the ambiguities of the Sino-Russian 
relationship.”21  This reality makes it an interesting and pertinent aspect to understand 
when analyzing the Sino-Russian relationship. 
The RFE possesses the vast majority of strategic resources and economic 
potential that Russia may draw on as it strives for sustained resurgence in the twenty-first 
century international order.  Gilbert Rozman states that “together with eastern and 
western Siberia, the Russian Far East is a vast treasure house of natural resources, 
especially energy that can supply the enormous populations and booming economies of 
East Asia.”22  The commercial viability of exploiting these resources in ways that will 
enable Russia to be competitive in global energy markets remains suspect at best 
 
19 John J. Stephan, The Russian Far East: A History (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1994), 
2. 
20 Ibid., 7. 
21 Lo, Axis of Convenience, 56. 




                                                
though.23 The region contains tremendous obstacles to the realization of these economic 
aspirations due to the realities of its geography, its environment, and its history of neglect 
by Russian central authorities.  It continues to suffer from what many call the “Siberian 
Curse” under which “irrational development policies, mostly during the Soviet era, 
located people in cold, inhospitable areas with poor prospects under market 
conditions.”24  It is the Russian Federation’s long-term hope that it can deviate from 
these past historical tre
The RFE makes up roughly 40 percent of the Russian Federation with 
approximately 6.2 million square kilometers of landmass.25  It encompasses several 
environments, but the common theme among them is harshness.  Close to “seventy 
percent of its landmass is covered in permafrost, severely hindering development.”26  
The harsh realities of the environment and climate are compounded by its remoteness 
from the European center of power in Russia.  Susan Davis elucidates the stark reality of 
this remoteness by stati
The RFE is over 7,500 miles from Moscow and ten hours by plane.  Much 
of the RFE is six to nine time zones away from European Russia.  The 
remoteness from the federal center of the Russian Federation has certain 
costs and benefits for the region.  Even under Soviet rule, there was a 
feeling of freedom that permeated the region due to its distance from 
Moscow.27  
These geographical realities have combined with other factors that will be discussed later 
to make the RFE a region of high risk and high reward that has so far eluded the Russian 
Federation’s attempts at beneficial long-term economic exploitation on its own terms. 
In order to understand twenty-first century Sino-Russian relational dynamics in 
the RFE, it is helpful to provide a summary of the history of their interactions in the 
 
25 See Emma Chanlett-Avery, Rising Energy Competition and Energy Security in Northeast Asia: 
Issues for U.S. Policy (accessed March 13, 2010); available at 
http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/RL32466_20080513.pdf. 
24 Rozman, Strategic Thinking about the Far East, 37. 
25 Sue Davis, The Russian Far East: The Last Frontier? (New York: Routledge, 2003), 1. 
26 Stephan, The Russian Far East: A History, 9. 
27 Davis, The Russian Far East: The Last Frontier? 3. 
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region during the past 350 years.  This will provide the relevant context necessary to 
understanding the evolution of several issues that remain salient in understanding their 
relationship in the region today.  This summary will begin in the seventeenth century and 
end with Vladimir Putin’s ascendance to power on December 31, 1999, after Boris 
Yeltsin’s resignation. 
Sporadic contact between the Romanov Empire and the Qing Dynasty began in 
the seventeenth century.28  This was the result of Russian expansion eastward and 
Chinese migrations north.  These demographic expansions led to “several armed 
skirmishes and the development of extensive trade networks” in the Amur basin that 
eventually necessitated the signing of the Treaty of Nerchinsk on September 6, 1689.29  
This treaty represented the first Sino-Russian border agreement in the modern state 
system, and was negotiated on favorable terms by the Manchu Qing Empire.  It gave 
control of the Amur valley and Primorye to the Qing and deterred Russian abilities to 
migrate to the Pacific.30 
More regular contact began to occur in the nineteenth century during a period in 
Chinese history that saw the decline and eventual demise of the Qing Empire.  During 
China’s “century of humiliation,” Russia was able to negotiate a series of “unequal 
treaties” within a backdrop of European imperial ambitions and coercive domestic 
interference that spanned from the first Opium War in 1842 to the founding of the 
People’s Republic of China in 1949.  The first of these negotiated territorial concessions 
occurred with the Treaty of Aigun in 1858.  This treaty awarded all Qing territory to the 
left bank of the Amur River back to Russia.   The second concession occurred with the 
Treaty of Peking in 1860.  This treaty forced the Qing to give up the Primorye and its 
access to the Pacific Ocean.  The 1864 Treaty of Tarbagatai specified prior agreements 
within the 1860 Treaty of Peking in more detail and solidified considerable Qing losses 
of territory to Imperial Russia at a time of extreme weakness.31   
 
28 Lo, Axis of Convenience, 20. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Davis, The Russian Far East: The Last Frontier? 9. 
31 Stephan, The Russian Far East: A History, 6–11. 
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Qing-Russian relations during this time were extremely “unbalanced” in favor of 
tsarist Russia, and have left a lasting historical legacy.  This period left the Russians with 
a sense of superiority and strategic entitlement that still influences contemporary 
relations.32  For the Chinese, this “unequal treaty” period left a legacy of ambiguity over 
the rightful ownership of the RFE that is still debated in certain Chinese circles today.33  
It continues to be referred to by many academics and nationalists within China as the 
“lost one-and-a-half million square kilometers.”34  It has also come to symbolize its 
“century of humiliation” at the hands of outside powers.35 
These legacies were still evident in Sino-Soviet relations in the twentieth century.  
As the Sino-Soviet split deepened in the 1960s because of mistrust and ideological 
divergences, gradual militarization of the Sino-Soviet border occurred and was followed 
by border confrontations in 1969.  Many of these were along the contested banks of the 
Amur and Ussuri Rivers in the RFE.36  Both of these rivers contain hundreds of disputed 
islands that continued to incite dispute and conflict along the border well after the 
cessation of these border hostilities.  The largest border clash occurred on Zhenbao Island 
on the Ussuri River on March 2, 1969.  There were reports in Moscow of up to 31 dead 
Russian soldiers and it came to symbolize the historical ambiguity behind rightful 
ownership of the RFE and represent the mistrust and acrimony that has defined this 
relationship during different periods of history.37   
As signs of rapprochement began to appear in the 1980s, with the resuming of 
bilateral foreign ministry talks in 1982, the issue of the contested borders along the RFE 
and China came into focus.  In 1986, during a speech in Vladivostok, Gorbachev publicly 
proposed a new bilateral agreement moving the China-RFE border to the middle of the 
channel in the Amur River.  This suggestion was the first proposed concession from a 
 
32 Wohlforth, Russia’s Missing Asian Revisionism, 100–109.  
33 Lo, Axis of Convenience, 21. 
34 Ibid., 71.  
35 Ibid., 21. 
36 Garnett, Challenges of the Sino-Russian Strategic Partnership, 42. 
37 Lyle J. Goldstein, “Return to Zhenbao Island: Who Started Shooting and Why It Matters,” The 
China Quarterly, no. 168 (December 2001): 986–990. 
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Russian leader dating back to the height of China’s vulnerability to Russian imperialism 
in the nineteenth century.38  This political gesture signified a new turn in Sino-Soviet 
relations and a desire for normalizing relations with China.  This political olive branch 
eventually led to further positive bilateral developments during the 1990s and a series of 
bilateral border agreements that attempt to solve the contentious border issues of the past 
350 years.39   
Over this decade, the Chinese and the Soviet Union/Russian Federation concluded 
two agreements that signified an end to much of the contestation over their 4,300 km 
border, which remains the largest land border in the world.  The first border agreement 
occurred in May 1991 and settled the majority of the disputes along the eastern border.40  
This agreement settled several areas of contention along the Ussuri and Amur Rivers with 
the exception of the islands of Tarabov (Yinlong) and Bolshoi Ussuriysky (Heixiazi).  
These were excluded from the agreement and left unresolved until the 2000s.  It was 
ratified by both parties in 1992.  The second agreement dealt with the much shorter 
western boundary and was easier to resolve.  Negotiations concluded in 1994 and it was 
ratified in 1995.  These agreements signified an end to over thirty years of Sino-Russian 
militarization over the question of borders.41   
The history of Sino-Russian relations in the RFE has left both sides with several 
points of contention and a residue of ambiguity in the relationship as each state has 
continued to expand and strengthen the “strategic partnership” into the twenty-first 
century.  From a Russian perspective, the RFE continues to be seen as an asset that will 
be utilized on Russian terms.  From a Chinese perspective, it realizes the economic 
potential of these regions but is in no hurry to acquiesce to Russian demands for 
favorable terms or create a situation where it is dependent on these resources in the 
future.  China also recognizes that the Russians are in a far weaker economic and political 
 
38 Lo, Axis of Convenience: Moscow, Beijing, and the New Geopolitics, 27. 
39 Vidya Nadkarni, Strategic Partnerships in Asia: Balancing without Alliances (New York: 
Routledge, 2010), 54. 
40 See Bi Lun, Successful Demarcation Makes Strong Russia Ties (accessed July 11, 2010); available 
from http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2004-10/15/content_382661.htm. 
41 Nadkarni, Strategic Partnerships in Asia, 64–65. 
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position than they seem to realize.42  The following sections analyze the specific 
dynamics of Sino-Russian relations in the RFE as well as contemporary issues that have 
affected it during the first decade of the twenty-first century.   
B. SINO-RUSSIAN INTERACTIONS 
The first decade of the twenty-first century was a period of unfulfilled economic 
expectations and extensive bilateral restraint for the People’s Republic of China in the 
RFE.  “Russia’s biggest problem at the beginning of the twenty-first century was the lack 
of a functioning model for regional development in East Siberia and the Russian Far 
East.”43  In spite of this reality, it was a period that began with hope for the Russian 
people and China as the country began to shift back under the central authority of the 
national government with the election of Vladimir Putin in 2000.  Disappointingly, this 
hope quickly faded as the Russian Federation reverted to the status quo behavior that 
defined its conduct towards China and its own people in the RFE during the preceding 
decade.  This was a Russian pattern of economic unreliability, constant stalling, and a 
general inability to execute a comprehensive national policy capable of realizing the 
RFE’s economic potential.44  This reality has shifted slightly during the latter stages of 
this decade due to the 2008 global economic crisis; current Russian president Dmitry 
Medvedev’s acknowledgement that Moscow could “lose” the RFE if a coherent policy is 
not adopted; and the gradual, albeit slow, realization that Moscow needs China if it is 
going to overturn the region’s history of economic depression and neglect.45 
Several lingering issues, rooted in the history of Sino-Russian state-to-state 
relations, continued to hinder Chinese overtures during this period.  These overtures were 
geared towards economic cooperation, interdependence, and, ironically, the possible 
 
42 Rozman, Strategic Thinking about the Russian Far East, 46. 
43 Dmitri Trenin, “Russia’s Asia Policy under Vladimir Putin, 2005–2005,” in Russian Strategic 
Thought toward Asia, ed. Gilbert Rozman, Kazuhiko Togo, and Joseph P. Ferguson (New York, NY: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 111. 
44 Stephen Blank, “The Russo–Chinese Energy Follies,” China Brief 8, no. 23 (December 2008): 1. 
45 Stephen Blank writes that “Beijing has gained serious geopolitical advantages over Moscow in the 
RFE because of the global economic crisis.  This is affecting Moscow’s ability to control the RFE.  
Moscow now looks favorably on Chinese investments”; also see Will Russia Lose its Far East? (accessed 
July 1, 2010); available from http://topics.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/09/30/will-russia-lose-its-far-east/. 
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realization of Russian long-term economic goals for the region.  “Many have noted that 
Russia has been an unreliable, suspicious, and difficult partner for China over the last 
twenty years.”46  This statement rings true at all levels of Sino-Russian relations in the 
RFE from 2000 to 2009.  Even though the “volume of bilateral trade rose steadily during 
the 1990s and both countries stood to gain from increased cross-border commercial 
exchanges in the economically depressed regions of the Russian Far East,” the Russian 
Federation remained loath to give its full economic cooperation or develop policies that 
would foster a more symmetrical and integrated growth of trade.47  It continued to 
communicate strategically in joint statements and other diplomatic circles a message of 
bilateral economic cooperation and development in the RFE while acting in ways that 
sent a quite different one.   
The Russian dichotomy between words and actions has been an enduring fact 
within Sino-Russian relations in the RFE both historically, since rapprochement, and 
during the first decade of the twenty-first century.  In order to understand the dynamics in 
play that affect Russian decison making, it is pertinent to provide a list of relevant factors 
that will assist in explaining the behavior of the Russian Federation during its state-to-
state interactions in the RFE and in several other areas of Sino-Russian relations during 
the past decade.  This list includes: Russian xenophobia and fears of “quiet expansionism, 
pervasive corruption,48 Russian demographic shifts,49 the “besieged fortress” mentality, 
misgovernment at the local level, narrow and dysfunctional local economies,50 a sense of 
cultural inferiority,51 rampant criminality, and a lack of human capital and 
 
46 Gilbert Rozman, Chinese Strategic Thought toward Asia (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2010), 144. 
47 Nadkami, Strategic Partnerships in Asia, 75.  
48 Russian Xenophobia and fears of “quiet expansionism” are rooted in the memories of Chinese 
territorial claims to the region; Lo believes these stem from long-term Soviet and Russian neglect as well. 
49 Demographic concerns stem from a larger demographic decline in the Russian population 
statewide.  It is exacerbated by the social, cultural, and economic environment of the region. 
50 The “besieged fortress” mentality stems from the feeling of nostalgia for the Russian Far East’s past 
as an isolated and militarized region of the Soviet Union because it was safe from Chinese expansionism.  
51 Many Russian’s feel culturally inferior in comparison to the Chinese traits of diligence and 
entrepreneurship.  This phenomenon spurs the Russian sense of xenophobia and fears of quiet 
expansionism in the region. 
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entrepreneurial spirit in the region.52  This list of economic, cultural, and social factors, 
as well as Russia’s sense of strategic entitlement, permeates the majority of Russian 
perspectives in the region and in many of its other foreign policy views during this 
period.  These factors have severely hindered the realization of Chinese economic 
interests in the RFE and, as discussed later, continue to present problems to the present 
day.  It also forced it to exploit other areas of potential cooperation until Russian decision 
makers, as they began to do in the later stages of the decade, desperately realized their 
prospects for a sustained resurgence as a major power were tied to economic cooperation 
with the Chinese.   
The following two sections provide a sampling of relevant examples of significant 
Sino-Russian interactions in the RFE over the past decade.  This will elucidate two 
themes that permeate Sino-Russian relations in the RFE during this period.  First, from a 
Chinese perspective, it will illustrate a continued pattern of restraint in the face of 
irrational Russian fears centered on xenophobia, quiet expansionism, and a sense of 
cultural inferiority due to myriad social and cultural legacies.  It will also demonstrate 
continued Chinese attempts to facilitate economic cooperation, even in the face of 
Russian actions to promote self-interests at the expense of bilateral interests or even in 
the face of bilateral agreements.  This “bottom line” approach to economic negotiations, 
from the Russian perspective, will reappear as a general approach or theme--replete with 
periods of incessant stalling, unfulfilled promises, unreliability, and a general inability to 
unilaterally solve its social, cultural, and economic problems in the RFE. 
1. 2000–2004 
The recentralization campaign, launched in the Russian Federation as Vladimir 
Putin was elected into office in 2000, signaled a time of increased expectations for the 
Chinese government and the Russian people in terms of economic cooperation in the 
Russian Far East.  His speech in Blagoveshchensk in July 2000, with his remarks 
“condemning Moscow’s past neglect and calling for immediate action in the Russian Far 
 
52 Rozman, in Chinese Strategic Thought toward Asia, writes that “the Russian economy was too 
criminalized, the people in the Russian Far East lacked entrepreneurial and technical skills expected from 
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East,” indicated that the region would be a focus of his administration.53  The July 2001 
Treaty of Good Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation between the Russian 
Federation and the People’s Republic of China furthered these expectations with an 
agreed upon framework to enhance commercial and technical cooperation.54  From one 
perspective, “This 20-year strategic and economic cooperation treaty was to be the most 
far-reaching one ever entered into since the time of Mao and Stalin.”55  These significant 
events seemed to signal a new era and potential in Sino-Russian cooperation in the RFE. 
However, the reality of continued Russian dichotomy and opaque policymaking soon 
became apparent to China as it continued its attempts to spur economic cooperation in the 
region.56 
As Putin continued to centralize his power, especially over the energy sector in 
Russia, the first evidence of this continued dichotomy between words and actions started 
to appear.  In July 2001, a bilateral feasibility study and tentative agreement was signed 
concurrently with the Treaty of Good Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation to 
explore the construction of the Angarsk-Daqing pipeline.  This joint venture was touted 
as a “future energy bridge between the two Asian powers.”57  In May 2003, “an 
agreement between Russia and China, endorsed by presidents Putin and Hu, cleared the 
way for the pipeline to go from the city of Angarsk to Daqing” and would cost an 
estimated $1.7 billion.58  In a September 2005 decision, Putin decided to include Japan, a 
major energy competitor, in a multi-route project that was more ambitious and had the 
potential for bigger Russian profits over the long term.59  This sequence of events 
demonstrates the extent to which Russian self-interests could prevail and trump even 
agreed bilateral accords, particularly in Russian economic dealings.  This is especially 
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true in the energy sector and is a microcosm of the Russian Federation’s overall pattern 
of unreliability and an inability to fulfill its economic promises to China in the greater Far 
East.   
With Hu Jintao’s succession as the leader of the People’s Republic of China in 
2003, China would continue its policy of restraint in its dealings with the Russian 
Federation.  In his first joint statement with President Putin, he agreed to create a working 
group to deal with Russian fears concerning the illegal migration of Chinese nationals 
into the RFE.60  This was viewed as a pervasive problem among local Russians and was 
persistently utilized as a political tool in the region at the expense of reality.  Even so, in 
another attempt to foster an environment of cooperation, the Chinese agreed to participate 
in the working group.  No progress was made in assuaging unsubstantiated Russian 
perceptions and fears of “quiet expansionism” though.  This is another example of 
Chinese attempts to cooperate with Russian wishes in order to facilitate a paradigm shift 
toward an environment of widespread economic cooperation in the RFE. 
In 2004, a supplementary agreement on the unresolved elements of the eastern 
border was signed in a joint communiqué.61  It was ratified by the Chinese National 
People’s Congress and the Russian State Duma in 2005, and went into effect at the end of 
2008.62  This agreement was a positive development and brought a complete resolution 
to the border situation for the first time in the history of Sino-Russian relations.  It had 
substantial political meaning at the national level, but in reality, did little to change local 
Russian perceptions of the “yellow peril” or to solve the often-contentious border 
dynamics at the local level.     
During the same year, “extremely reliable and exhaustive” research on the 
Chinese presence in the Russian Far East, performed by Mikhail Alexseev and Vilya 
Gelbras, concluded that the number of legal Chinese residents in the Russian Far East 
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was “statistically insignificant.”63  It also determined that illegal immigration levels were 
“not big enough to cause a panic,” let alone speak of a Chinese demographic expansion 
that was a potential problem.”64  In addition, based on an analysis of Chinese nationals 
working in Khabarovsk and Vladivostok, it discovered that most Chinese migrants 
viewed the RFE as a place to work, make money, and leave.65  From a Russian 
perspective, the research indicated that Russian xenophobia was still a pervasive problem 
among local populations.  It also indicated that the central government was continuing to 
ignore this problem and in some cases was complicit in perpetuating it to create a 
political advantage.  In an earlier 2001 policy memo titled “The Chinese are Coming: 
Public Opinion and Threat Perception in the Russian Far East” Alexseev writes: 
Ethnic stereotypes play a large part in perceptions of security.  In my survey, the 
Russians in Primorye appear to view Chinese migrants as distant, socially undesirable, 
and fiercely protective of their cultural values. Asked about stereotypes contrasting 
Chinese migrants from Russians, twice as many respondents saw the Chinese are more 
hardworking, entrepreneurial, and greedy; three times as many respondents saw them as 
more sly; and almost 20 times more respondents saw them as less generous than ethnic 
Russians.66 
This statement, as well as the 2004 research, demonstrated how detrimental this 
local environment was and to the prospects of Sino-Russian economic cooperation in the 
Russian Far East.  It also demonstrated one of many levels of failure in the Russian 
Federation’s attempts at enacting a coherent and comprehensive policy geared towards 
the successful socio-economic development of the RFE.   
The first half of the decade did see a dramatic rise in small-scale economic 
cooperation in the RFE and a dramatic increase in trade.  For example, “Heilongjiang’s 
trade turnover with Russia, mainly Primorye, reached $3.83 billion in 2004, a more than 
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fourfold increase since 1999.67  In spite of this, the fact remains that the legacy of social, 
cultural, and economic factors listed earlier, the Russian Federation’s sense of strategic 
entitlement, and an inability to formulate a successful socio-economic policy for the 
development of the RFE, continued to hinder the realization of its long-term strategic and 
economic goals in the region from 2000 to 2004.  As will be discussed in the next 
section, these factors continue to permeate and effect Sino-Russian relations in the RFE 
and the greater Far East region during the second half of the decade and up until the 
present day. 
2. 2005–2009 
By 2005, Russian actions toward Chinese overtures of economic cooperation in 
the Russian Far East and the greater Far Eastern region continued to indicate that “Russia 
intended to tread a narrow path between engaging China and avoiding the position of 
emerging as a junior partner or a natural resource appendage.”68  This was the prevailing 
strategy in Moscow despite the long-term geopolitical necessity of Chinese investment 
and regional integration for the RFE.  Dimitri Trenin, in a March 2005 Financial Times 
article, states “Moscow must find a way to perform the feat of integrating the Russian Far 
East and Siberia (RFES) with the rest of Russia and with their Northeast Asian neighbors 
before it is too late.”69  Although bilateral trade grew to approximately $30 billion in 
2005, it remained insignificant compared to Chinese trade with United States.  This 
metric was a disappointing indicator to both sides because of the enormous potential for 
bilateral economic developments in the RFE that was left unrealized.70  
In 2006, ironically known as the year of China in Russia, another period of 
disappointment and unrealized expectations developed for the Chinese side in the RFE.  
Energy issues continued to be a focal point of relations due to Russian shortfalls in 
deliveries and continued stalling on several proposed projects.  In March of 2006, during 
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President Putin’s visit to Beijing, he agreed on a decision to “expand trade, economic 
relations, and to build to gas pipelines from Siberia to China soon.”71  He also agreed to 
“increase bilateral trade levels up to $60–80 billion a year by 2010.”72  Later in the same 
year, Russian delivery targets of close to fifteen million tons of crude oil fell short by 
approximately five million barrels.  This was due to substantial technical difficulties and 
the necessity of delivery by rail due to a dearth of cross-border pipelines.73   
In December of the same year, Kamil Iskhakov, the presidential envoy in the 
RFE, proposed the “creation of a state commission on the Far East directly under the 
supervision of the prime minister.” Its intention would be to facilitate Vladivostok’s 
preparation for the 2012 Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) summit, and 
develop and manage a coherent and comprehensive policy on integration and socio-
economic reform in the region.74  As of this writing, the commission has not yet been 
formed. 
The period during 2007 followed with more rhetoric on Russian Far Eastern 
development and the enhancement of Sino-Russian economic cooperation in the region.  
As with the previous eight years, Russian words did not match action.  On July 13, during 
bilateral talks in Moscow, Sergei Lavrov, the Russian foreign minister, stated “there 
mutual interest in investment and energy cooperation, including the close coordination of 
plans to develop the Russian Far East and Siberia, as well as Northeastern China.”75  In a 
developing trend, inherent of the reality and not the rhetoric of bilateral energy relations, 
Russian promises for oil delivery to China fell by almost ten percent from January to 
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November.  This was due to setbacks with the Eastern Siberia Pacific Ocean pipeline 
(ESPO) which was supposed to have been completed in 2006.76   
This was also a year when the governor of Primorye Territory, Sergei Darkin, 
presented an “ambitious plan for the region called Pacific Russia to the Year 2020.”77  It 
was based on his new book, and projected an economic growth-rate of 750 percent during 
the proposed timeframe.  The projected metrics and wished-for projects within this 
proposed venture suggested that Sergei Darkin was not in touch with the economic, 
cultural, and social realities in the RFE.  It was also an indication of the much larger 
problem of national-local disconnect and general disinterest consistently displayed by the 
Russian central government.  
By the beginning of 2008, the Sino-Russian trade imbalance began growing 
quicker than anticipated due to the global economic crisis and its effect on energy 
prices.78  This reality forced the Russian Federation and new President Dimitri 
Medvedev to adjust the “bottom line” approach utilized under Putin for the past eight 
years.   This is not to say that the Russian Federation was willing to completely acquiesce 
to Chinese economic interests for the first time this decade.  On the contrary, strategic 
entitlement and the legacy of other factors listed earlier still played a role in Sino-Russian 
economic relations in the Far East.  For example, contention still occurred over the 
negotiations to build the Daqing spur of the proposed ESPO pipeline as the Russians 
continued to deal from a position of perceived power and entitlement.79  In October, 
Rosneft and Transneft, both Russian companies, were still in the process of negotiating 
for Chinese loans from China’s National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC).  This was a 
contentious process centering on Russian problems with oil pricing and the interest rates 
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of Chinese loans.  An agreement finally occurred in February 2009.  In exchange for $25 
billion in Chinese loans, the Russian Federation would provide crude oil supplies for 
twenty years beginning upon completio
As the global economic crisis continued to effect energy prices and Russia’s 
extensive raw material exports from the RFE into 2009, Dmitry Medvedev 
“acknowledged that unless China invested in large-scale projects in the Russian Far East, 
Moscow’s plans to develop the region could not materialize.”81  This tacit admission was 
an outgrowth of the dramatic decline in the Russian economy. It was finally forcing the 
Russian Federation to rethink its approach to Chinese economic interests in the RFE.  
These dynamics spurred a memorandum of understanding (MOU) on trade, energy 
cooperation, and investment cooperation that promised $700 million in loans from the 
Chinese Export-Import Bank to Vnesheconomobank (VEB).  Subsequent financial deals 
with Lukkoil, Russia’s largest oil company, gave the Chinese increased leverage in the 
energy sector of the Far East.82  These occurrences are indicative of a shift in Russian 
policy in the Russian Far East born out of financial desperation and an inability to 
diversify and stimulate its economy in the region without significant help from the 
Chinese.  
The second half of the decade, much like the first, saw a steady increase in trade.  
Again, this was mostly small-scale in nature and is indicative, as President Medvedev 
stated, of the need to develop large-scale projects in the Russian Far East in order to 
integrate and develop the region properly.  Unfortunately for the Russian Federation, 
financial desperation and a continued policy failure towards the RFE, since its opening in 
1992, forced its hand.   
It forced Russia to adjust its “bottom line” approach to economic policy during 
the latter stages of the decade and acquiesce to some of China’s economic interests in the 
region.  Russian financial vulnerability also allowed the Chinese to gain leverage within 
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Russia’s energy sector, as well as increase its overall economic influence in the RFE.  
The reality for Russia was becoming one in which its Russian Far East policy failures 
were gradually causing it to become a “junior partner” in bilateral regional economic 
relations and putting it at a decisive disadvantage.  The irony remains that the Russian 
Federation’s sense of strategic entitlement and the culminating legacy of the social, 
cultural, and economic factors listed earlier, all of which could be changed by the 
Russians themselves, were and remain one of the primary causes of this gradual slide in 
the balance of power in Sino-Russian relations.  
C. TRENDS AND ISSUES 
Sino-Russian relations in the RFE have followed a tumultuous and often uncertain 
path during the first decade of the twenty-first century.  Even in the face of dramatic 
increases in small-scale trade, gradual steps towards greater energy cooperation through 
investment and large-scale joint ventures, and the expansion of cross-border ties, the 
legacy issues in the region continue to impinge on the relationship.  Absent new or 
different approaches to change local perceptions and introduce viable initiatives to raise 
the RFE’s position in Russia’s development policies, these issues will continue to 
undermine any positive trends.  They will also restrain potential expansion of larger-
scale, mutually beneficial pillars of a successful long-term Sino-Russian relationship.  Lo 
states that “while talk of crisis is premature, the present state of affairs in the RFE cannot 
continue indefinitely.”83 A myriad of issues, mentioned throughout the preceding 
analysis, have the potential to make the situation worse and continue to stunt the small-
scale positive trends in this relationship as China and Russia enter the next decade of 
their strategic partnership. 
First, a continued demographic decline of Russian inhabitants in an already 
sparsely populated region could continue to combine with the gradual increase of Chinese 
migrants moving across the border to create an unsustainable situation.  This 
development is a plausible likelihood right now due to the local economic, social, and 
cultural realities combined with the policy failures of the Russian government.  It has 
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created a vicious circle where the prospects for employment opportunities that meet 
Russian standards continues to decline as population pressures in China make Chinese 
migrants only too happy to fill the void.  This dynamic has the potential to exacerbate the 
Russian feelings of xenophobia and cultural inferiority that are already pervasive in the 
region.84  It is a situation that, as with most of the others, will only recede under the 
auspices of a comprehensive Russian policy towards the RFE that integrates it with 
China, the rest of the Russian Federation, and Northeast Asia. 
Second, as Chinese influence continues to grow in the RFE, two potential 
problems, one short-term and one long-term, have the potential to appear.  In the short 
term, Chinese patience and persistence in dealing with Russian fears and perceptions and 
its sense of strategic entitlement during bilateral engagement over the RFE may recede.  
As the bilateral trade balance continues to shift in Beijing’s favor, Chinese leverage 
within the Russian energy sector increases, its cross-border economic links continue to 
solidify, and its overall sphere of influence in Northeast Asia continues to increase, China 
may decide to deal with the Russian Federation in a more assertive manor over socio-
economic issues in the RFE.  In the long term, some authors even speculate that this 
process could manifest itself in a “nationalistic revival of Chinese claims to the RFE.”85  
While such a development would be a significant shift from current conditions, history 
has shown only a few decades ago in Sino-Russian relations, that today’s favorable 
environment for bilateral relations could be tomorrow’s remilitarization of the Sino-
Russian border and breakdown in relations. 
Finally, and most importantly for the Russian Federation, a continued failure to 
implement a comprehensive and successful economic policy in the RFE could prove 
disastrous to Russia’s short- and long-term prospects.  On the other hand, the preceding 
discussion suggests that RFE policy could have a higher likelihood of success if it were 
to focus on regional and global integration and acknowledge in practice and 
implementation the need to include Chinese economic cooperation and interdependence.  
Absent a successful RFE policy, the Russian Federation may find itself in increasingly 
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desperate situations and vulnerable to Chinese interests—just as it did during the 2008 
global economic crisis.  Overall, a successful policy in the RFE would solve the myriad 
of other potential problems that continue to afflict the region.  It is the key to solving the 
rest of the legacy issues as well.  Put more directly: “As long as Russia’s rulers refuse to 
face up seriously to the challenge of the region’s long-term economic and social 
development, then notional risks could one day turn into concrete realties.”86  This 
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III. THE SHANGHAI COOPERATION ORGANIZATION 
A. BACKGROUND 
Central Asia is a region where the potential for Sino-Russian cooperation and 
contention exist simultaneously.  Historically, the region has experienced periods in 
which each state has been the hegemonic power.  Russia enjoyed significant power and 
influence in the region over the past two hundred years.87  During this period of Russian 
dominance, China and Russia came to an understanding that has served both states 
security interests.  The dynamics of this understanding have changed during the early 
stages of the twenty-first century due to China’s rise and geopolitics in Central Asia that 
have continued to transform since the end of the Cold War.  Lo called this informal 
security arrangement a “tacit bargain.”  China would recognize the historical “status quo” 
in the region as long as Russia maintained stability and controlled separatist movements 
and extremist elements that had the potential to cause territorial problems in China.88  
This bargain helped to assuage Chinese security concerns in the western portion of its 
territory, especially in Xinjiang Province.89   
As will be discussed in this section, geopolitical events during the past decade 
have eroded some of the foundations of this tacit bargain and have caused a shift in 
Chinese foreign policy in the region.  The recent formation of the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization (SCO) created an institutional forum to enact this new foreign policy.  It 
also increased competition and cooperation in several areas by including the Central 
Asian Republics.  Finally, it exacerbated the Sino-Russian “tug-of-war” that was 
beginning to emerge over the direction and collective identity of the region.  
The vast resource potential of Central Asia remains the focal point for much of 
Sino-Russian competition.  Both states have expended significant resources in the region 
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to maintain, develop, and utilize ties that will help to realize their interests.  In the 
Chinese case, efforts have focused on the diversification of its energy portfolio in order to 
lessen its dependence on exports from the Russian Federation and the Middle East.  In the 
Russian case, its efforts have centered on blocking any regional developments that will 
take away from Chinese purchases and dependence on Russian energy exports.  Russia 
still has an advantage in this regard due to the Soviet legacy in the region; but the 
Chinese continue to display an ability to utilize soft power deftly in ways that are raising 
China’s economic influence in the region.90   
This competition in the energy sphere is part of an overall trend of economic “tug-
of-war” between the Chinese and the Russians.  The Chinese have continued to develop 
economic ties and have been proponents of interdependence while the Russians have 
continued to “prefer barriers to economic integration.”91  The Russian Federation has 
attempted to block the growth of Sino-Central Asian economic ties by perpetuating the 
notion within the Central Asian Republics that China is gaining too much influence and 
its long-term goals are suspect.92  This bilateral economic tug-of-war has manifested 
itself within the SCO as one of several points of contention within the Sino-Russian 
relationship.  It feeds into the overall Sino-Russian contention over the direction and 
purpose of the SCO as it develops from 2001–2009. 
Overall, in light of the intense energy competition and several disagreements over 
the direction and regional identity of the SCO, it still remained in both states’ interests to 
maintain “stable regimes in the region as partners in the struggle against Islamic forces” 
and to minimize the potential for U.S. influence.93  China and Russia have both been 
cognizant of Islamic fundamentalism’s potential in a post-9/11 world and have both 
experienced complications with it first-hand in Xinjiang and Chechnya.  In terms of the 
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potential for U.S. influence in Central Asia, both states have been apprehensive about this 
aspect for generally congruent reasons.  Slight differences have arisen in how this 
apprehension manifested itself in Central Asia and in the SCO.  Beyond this, as eluded to 
earlier, Moscow and Beijing’s interests began to diverge.  This makes the SCO an 
interesting regional forum for analyzing the Sino-Russian relationship during the past 
decade because it has “allowed China a real say on Central Asian questions without 
leaving it completely vulnerable to demands by Russia that traditionally held sway in this 
region.”94   
The organizers or founders of what came to be known first as the “Shanghai Five” 
and later as the “Shanghai Cooperation Organization,” met for their first regional summit 
in the spring of 1996 in Shanghai “to delineate the geopolitical ambiguities surrounding 
their shared borders.”95  This regional summit created the groundwork for the emergence 
of the SCO as a regional organization in 2001.96  It was intended to spur military 
cooperation, limit the size of regional military exercises to no more than 40,000 troops, 
and initiate confidence building measures along the heavily militarized 110-km-wide 
frontier zone between Russia, China, and the 7,000-km border area affecting all other 
parties involved.97  The original states present at this summit included Russia, China, 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan.   
The impetus for this multilateral meeting went beyond the uncertainties of shared 
borders.  The gathering of these states was also a reaction to the growing regional 
problems in Central Asia resulting from the breakup of the Soviet Union.  These 
problems included trans-regional drug smuggling, separatist movements, and acts of 
terrorism associated with Islamic fundamentalism.  For the Russian Federation and 
China, these emerging trends represented a threat to stability and security in the region 
and also represented a shift away from the tacit bargain that defined the geopolitics of 
 
94 Rozman, Chinese Strategic Thought Towards Asia, 220. 
95 See The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (accessed March 19, 2010); available from 
http://www.cfr.org/publication/10883/. 
96 Jefferson E. Turner, “What is Driving India’s and Pakistan’s Interest in Joining the Shanghai 
Cooperation Organization,” Strategic insights 4, no. 8 (2005), 1. 
97 Garnett, Challenges of the Sino-Russian Strategic Partnership, 43. 
 30
                                                
Sino-Russian relations in Central Asia up to that point.  The ensuing meeting and  
negotiations culminated in the formation of a regional security alliance designed to deal 
with contemporary regional security and stability problems in a collective manner for the 
first time since the end of the Cold War.   
The alliance was formalized on the April 26, 1996, with the “Agreement on 
Confidence Building in the Military Field in the Border Areas.”  It is important to note 
that this agreement was designed to deal with what would eventually be institutionally 
expressed as the “three evils” of terrorism, separatism, and extremism.  These were all 
viewed by the signature states as internal matters or regional problems perpetuated by 
non-state actors.  This was not an agreement for collective defense against external state 
actors.  It was simply an agreement to facilitate cooperation on regional problems 
affecting regime and internal state security and to prevent aggression between Central 
Asian states in the execution of this cooperation.  These sentiments were expressed in the 
following statement from Article One of the agreement.  It stated “The military forces of 
the Parties deployed in the border area, as an integral part of the military forces of the 
Parties, shall not be used to attack another Party, conduct any military activity threatening 
the other Party and upsetting calm and stability in the border area.”98  The internal 
regional focus inherent in this landmark agreement was something that, as the SCO 
emerged and developed, became a point of constant Sino-Russian contention over 
identity and direction. 
In Moscow a year later, a second summit produced another agreement on April 
24, 1997.  The “Agreement on Mutual reduction of Military Forces in the Border Areas” 
reduced troop numbers in the vicinity of the border areas and asserted that any remaining 
armed forces must remain defensive in nature.99  Within this context, the Russians agreed 
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limits on a wide range of ground, air defense, and frontal aviation equipment and 
personnel” in order to meet the requirements.100  The Chinese followed suit with 
equipment and troop reductions as well.  
The next two meetings between these states occurred on July 3, 1998, in Almaty, 
Kazakhstan and on August 24, 1999, in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan.  During these meetings, 
multilateral talks began to expand beyond military, security, and border-related topics 
pertaining exclusively to the five participants.  The 1998 multilateral forum publicly 
discussed issues surrounding Indian and Pakistani nuclear testing and its ramifications for 
regional stability.  In 1999, the meeting in Bishkek began to delve into the economic 
sphere of regional relations.101 The expanding subject matter of these meetings was 
evidence of the emerging institutional ties and consultative mechanisms among these 
states.  Each state began to utilize these regional meetings as a forum for expanding 
regional dialogue and cooperation.  This is a trend that would continue into the twenty-
first century.102 
The term “Shanghai Five” was finally coined in 2000 during the group’s fifth 
meeting in Dushanbe, Tajikistan.  In 2001, China proposed the formal transformation of 
the Shanghai Five into an official multilateral regional organization that would continue 
its original mandate of security cooperation along the borders and collaboration on 
regional issues.103  On June 15, 2001, in tandem with the inclusion of Uzbekistan as a 
new member state, it officially became known as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.  
Its official mandate, as declared on the SCO’s official Web site is: 
Strengthening mutual confidence and good-neighbourly relations among 
the member countries; promoting effective cooperation in politics, trade 
and economy, science and technology, culture as well as education, 
energy, transportation, tourism, environmental protection and other fields; 
making joint efforts to maintain and ensure peace, security and stability in 
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the region, moving towards the establishment of a new, democratic, just 
and rational political and economic international order.104 
Member states envisioned this as a new type of multilateral organization designed to fight 
the “three evils” and confront any other emerging issues as the twenty-first century 
unfolded in Central Asia.  For the Sino-Russian relationship, it symbolized the 
continuation of their tacit agreement and was a tangible manifestation of the continued 
development of their “strategic partnership.”  In terms of their individual interests, the 
formation of the SCO meant different things to each of them. 
Russia envisioned utilizing the SCO as a geopolitical tool to maintain its regional 
influence at a time when regional and international systemic dynamics were continuing to 
change.  It also envisioned the SCO as a regional organization that could be shaped to 
balance against potential U.S. interests, any further North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO) expansion towards its sphere of influence, and long-term Chinese economic 
interests.105  This “geopolitically-centric” agenda, as Lo calls it, differed immensely from 
the Chinese desire to focus on economic aspects.  It also went against the intra-regional 
“spirit” of the 1996 agreement and 2001 SCO mandate with the exception of its desires to 
balance against Chinese interests in the region.  
In China, the formation of the SCO was seen as an economic opportunity in 
Central Asia and a chance to facilitate measures towards energy security.  It also gave 
legitimacy to China’s pursuit of regional political and economic influence in the wake of 
the breakup of the Soviet Union.106  The SCO would allow the Chinese to institutionally 
express its regional interests and contend to influence regional outcomes.  Most of its 
interests remained economic and political in nature, and were internally focused on 
Central Asia.  On the other hand, the Chinese had no interest or desire to be a part of a 
multilateral organization that would ever be construed as openly anti-United States or 
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anti-NATO.107 This perception would affect a robust Sino-U.S. economic relationship 
that was viewed as more important to cultivate in the long term than any Russian 
relations centered on anti-U.S. or anti-NATO sentiments.  It would also run counter to 
China’s carefully managed international identity as a peaceful “status quo” power.108  
Overall, the manifestation of the SCO as a regional identity represented a formal 
arena for competition and cooperation in the Sino-Russian relationship during the 
preceding decade.  It not only represented converging interests on stability and the 
blocking of U.S. influence in the region, but also represented diverging interests on the 
direction and identity of the SCO as it developed and evolved.  The Russian Federation 
favored a geopolitically centric organization with an external focus while the Chinese 
preferred an economically centric organization that did not overtly act as a counterweight 
to the United States and NATO.  The following section will analyze the specific 
dynamics of Sino-Russian interactions in the SCO during the first decade of the twenty-
first century.  It will demonstrate the continuous Sino-Russian “tug-of-war” over the 
SCO’s direction and identity as a regional organization.  
B. SINO-RUSSIAN INTERACTIONS   
An important starting point for understanding Sino-Russian cooperative and 
competitive dynamics in the SCO and Central Asia during the past decade is June 15, 
2001.  As stated earlier, this date marked the SCO’s official beginning as a regional 
institution.  Although annual summits had been occurring since 1996, the summer of 
2001 marked the official starting point for an institution that was very much still a work 
in progress.  Its original mandate encompassed many broad sweeping statements but the 
institution still needed to build the requisite institutional and legal framework necessary 
to be considered a viable regional organization with a purpose beyond rhetoric.  A public 
announcement of the completion of this framework was not given until the fifth 
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anniversary summit in Shanghai in June 2006.109   The “Declaration on the Fifth 
Anniversary of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization” proclaimed that “the SCO had 
completed the building of the institutions and the legal framework necessary to ensure its 
effective functioning.”110  As with most of the proclamations of the SCO to this point, it 
was not rich on details regarding these frameworks, nor how they were going to function.   
The preceding highlights two continuous trends that persist throughout much of 
the past decade.  First, the SCO’s rhetoric outstripped its achievements and, second, it 
had yet to “develop a genuine collective identity.”111  These prevailing trends were an 
outgrowth of the contention inherent in several aspects of the Sino-Russian relationship 
in Central Asia during this period.  As stated earlier, the Russians saw the SCO as a 
geopolitically centric organization and the Chinese envisioned it functioning as an 
economically centric institution.  This reality slowed down the development of a coherent 
set of frameworks; it also hindered the development of a collective regional identity as 
the Sino-Russian tug-of-war over continued to leave its mark on the SCO.   
On the plus side, the SCO was able to develop a few positive attributes during the 
previous decade that demonstrated its potential as a regional organization.  First, it 
showed an ability to demonstrate solidarity on certain issues.112  This fact was 
demonstrated during the 2005 summit in Astana.  During the summit, the SCO issued a 
joint statement calling for a “final timeline for American forces to leave the region,” and 
also agreed not to allow the United States to send observers to Peace Mission 2005 or 
2007.113  Second, it enhanced political coordination among SCO member states and 
enhanced security ties among all of its members.114  An example of this can be seen in 
the increased military-to-military cooperation demonstrated during the “Peace Mission” 
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initiatives of 2007 and 2009.115  Finally, while it still lacked a collective regional identity 
and had shortcomings in its institutional frameworks, the SCO still was able to develop 
into a functioning multilateral organization with some tangible achievements to its credit. 
It also enabled smaller member states in Central Asia to be heard in a regional forum for 
the first time, which was not necessarily the case prior to the SCO’s existence. Smaller 
member states were able to pursue and “maximize” their interests by strategically 
managing different facets of their relations with China and Russia.116 
The following two subsections provide a sampling of significant examples of 
Sino-Russian interactions in the SCO from 2001–2009.  This will elucidate two themes 
that pervaded Sino-Russian relations in Central Asia during the period.  First, it will 
demonstrate that the SCO was, and still is, mostly an institutional manifestation of Sino-
Russian cooperation and competition in the region.  The result has been a “tug-of-war” 
over strategic energy resources, economic development, organizational membership, and 
the direction and collective identity of the organization as it continues to develop.  These 
relational dynamics have had negative consequences on the development of the SCO as a 
regional organization, but have not completely hindered any positive developments over 
the past decade.  Finally, it will demonstrate that the United States’ continued presence in 
Central Asia also has had a dramatic effect on Sino-Russian regional dynamics and 
relations within the SCO.  It continues to give the Chinese and the Russians a regional 
focal point and point of convergence that goes beyond their disagreements and diverging 
interests in Central Asia. 
1. 2001–2004   
The September 2001 terrorist attacks in New York and Washington D.C. had a 
dramatic effect on Sino-Russian relations in Central Asia and within the newly formed 
SCO.  Vladimir Putin’s quick backing of an American and North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) military presence in Afghanistan in support of the newly declared 
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Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) caught the Chinese, and even Putin’s own military 
establishment, off-guard.117  This decision had implications for both states and the SCO 
as the decade moved forward. 
From a Russian perspective, Putin saw this as an opportunity to be seen as a vital 
regional ally by the United States in the fight against Islamic extremism and terrorism.  
He also knew that the Russian Federation was in no position to demand that the United 
States stay out of Central Asia but had a chance to gain economically and in other ways 
by publicly being seen as a regional proponent of the GWOT in Afghanistan.118  It also 
had the added benefit of assisting Russia and the Central Asian states deal with one of the 
region’s most pervasive regional problems.  It was one of the primary reasons behind the 
SCO’s establishment in the first place.119  The member states had spent almost two years 
working on a convention “designed to fight terrorism, separatism, and extremism” that 
was signed in accordance with the founding of the organization almost three months 
before the terrorist attacks in the United States had occurred.120  It made geopolitical 
sense to allow the Americans and NATO to solve a portion of this pervasive regional 
problem because, as Putin initially calculated, they would only be in Central Asia on a 
short-term basis.121  This turned out to be a dramatic miscalculation that would have 
implications for Sino-Russian relations. 
In China, the Russian Federation’s change in policy, enacted without any prior 
bilateral consultation, was viewed with surprise and consternation.  The effects of the 
Russian policy shift were exacerbated by Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan’s “quick moves to 
follow Russia’s lead and provide access to military bases outside the aegis of the 
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SCO.”122  In an uncomfortable position, the Chinese spun it as Sino-Russian regional 
solidarity in support of the war on terror.123  By October 2001, the Chinese were already 
making public pronouncements indicating their concern about the increased American 
and NATO military presence in Central Asia.  They eventually called a meeting of 
foreign ministers from the SCO member states in December of the same year to discuss 
issues surrounding the war in Afghanistan.124   
These developments highlighted three realities within the Sino-Russian 
Relationship in Central Asia.  First, it demonstrated that the Russians were 
“untrustworthy and weak” and could not be counted on to confer with China before 
pursuing its interests.125  Second, it was evidence that relations with the West, and the 
United State in particular, would always supplant the Sino-Russian “strategic 
partnership.” Finally, it demonstrated that the Russians could no longer be counted on to 
maintain its end of the tacit bargain in Central Asia.126 
Overall, this sequence of events affected Sino-Russian interactions significantly 
over the rest of the decade in two ways.  First, it signaled to China that it would have to 
develop a Central Asian strategy that was more flexible and dynamic in terms of 
engagement with the other member states in the SCO and in the greater Central Asian 
region.  In addition, it demonstrated the potential for the “re-emergence of a competitive 
strategic environment in Central Asia.”127  This possibility did not bode well for the 
growth of the SCO.  It was still in the process of constructing the relevant institutional 
frameworks and developing a consistent regional identity.  The prospects for long-term 
success in the SCO were significantly weakened by Sino-Russian contention centering on 
Russian decision making during the months following September Eleventh. 
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During the following year, the Russian Federation began to realize that the U.S. 
and NATO presence in Central Asia was beginning to appear as if it would remain for a 
much longer period than initially anticipated.  This realization, as well as several 
subsequent developments regarding the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the Central 
Asian color revolutions in Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan, began to shift Russia’s 
view of the utility of the American and NATO military presence in Afghanistan.128  This 
caused the Russian Federation to push to publicly reaffirm its “strategic partnership” with 
China and its commitment to the SCO at a time when China was apprehensive about its 
regional relationship with Russia, its level of influence in Central Asia, and the future 
direction of its foreign policy.  An initial manifestation of a Russian policy shift and 
reaffirmation of Sino-Russian regional solidarity against perceived Western 
encroachment and interference in regional affairs occurred during three proclamations.  
The first two proclamations occurred as part of the SCO summit in St. Petersburg on June 
7, 2002.  The final one came as part of the December 2002 joint statement.  
At the St. Petersburg summit, Vladimir Putin “insisted that Moscow’s 
increasingly close friendship with the West did not threaten its ‘partnership’ with 
China.”129  He also made several other public statements touting the strength and depth 
of the Sino-Russian relationship.  The member states of the SCO also formalized the 
organization’s Charter.  Article one states that the main goals and tasks of the SCO are: 
to strengthen mutual trust, friendship and good neighborliness between the 
member States; to consolidate multidisciplinary cooperation in the 
maintenance and strengthening of peace, security and stability in the 
region and promotion of a new democratic, fair and rational political and 
economic international order; to jointly counteract terrorism, separatism 
and extremism in all their manifestations…to promote human rights and 
fundamental freedoms in accordance with the international obligations of 
the member States and their national legislation; to maintain and develop 
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the prevention of international conflicts and in their peaceful settlement; to 
jointly search for solutions to the problems that would arise in the 
21st century.130  
Finally, the December 2002 joint statement focused on “coordination of positions in 
international affairs and in multilateral and regional organizations, and their joint efforts 
against terrorism.”131  
For China, these proclamations demonstrated that relations with Russia in Central 
Asia would always remain predicated on self-interest and would therefore continue to 
rapidly shift back and forth from East to West.  It also reinforced the continued utilization 
of a flexible and active foreign policy in the region.  For Russia, these developments were 
indicative of a change in Russian attitudes towards the United States and NATO and the 
beginning of a decline in state-to-state and state-to-organization relations between Russia 
and the West.  It also demonstrated the Russian Federation’s recognition that it needed to 
incorporate China and the Central Asian states into any strategy to oppose outside 
influence from the West in the region at a time when its influence was gradually 
receding.132   
How would the Russian Federation effectively co-opt China and the Central 
Asian states into supporting its shift in regional policy and balance against Chinese 
interests in the region at the same time?  The SCO was primarily a creation of the 
Chinese and, although many of its public statements contained veiled statements that 
were critical of U.S. and NATO actions in the region, it did not envision the SCO 
willingly adopting an overtly anti-Western stance.  An “attempt to revamp Russia’s 
marginalized position and to balance against both the Chinese and U.S. presence” spurred 
the creation of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO).133  
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The CSTO served two purposes that supported Russian interests.  It was utilized 
as a vehicle for undermining Chinese long-term interests in Central Asia, and it was also 
used to tout the Russian Federation as the primary geopolitical actor in any regional 
cooperation efforts between NATO, the United States, and Central Asia.134  This 
organization would go on to overlap in many of the functions and roles of the SCO 
during the decade with on major exception.  Without China as a member, it lacked the 
economic dynamism and potential that the Chinese brought to the SCO as a member-
state.  This severely reduced the CSTO’s potential for long-term growth in the region as 
an organization on par with the SCO and reduced its utility within the region as a vehicle 
for solving the region’s problems.  Lo states that “they are competing as organizations 
that cover much of the same ground, but for different sides.”135  The development of the 
CSTO did not enhance the Russian Federation’s regional standing in Central Asia and 
has not been effective at balancing against Chinese interests or perpetuating its desires for 
a more explicit anti-Western stance.  Its creation does, however, increase the potential for 
contention to develop in Sino-Russian relations in the future. 
In 2003, several significant developments occurred in the development of the 
SCO.  During its May summit in Moscow, the SCO elected its first Executive Secretary, 
signed a declaration legally binding the member states to its Charter, and approved 
governing regulations for its agencies.136  In August, the first SCO-sponsored 
multilateral joint military counterterrorism exercise known as “Cooperation 2003” 
occurred in two stages during the three-day period.137  The first stage was conducted in 
eastern Kazakhstan.  The second stage was conducted in western China and marked the 
first instance of a combined forces operation on Chinese soil.138  In September, during a 
second summit in Beijing, the executive committee of the Regional Anti-Terrorist 
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Structure (RATS) was formed as a coordination mechanism within the SCO to combat 
the “three evils” within the region.139  It would accomplish this task by fusing 
intelligence from the security services of SCO member states.140  
This organ became operational in November 2003 and moved into its permanent 
headquarters in Tashkent, Uzbekistan in 2004.  Since its inception, it has been viewed as 
a “qualified success” and has been able to act as a “relatively neutral body with 
unequalled information and expertise on issues of security of great importance to the 
member states.”141  The developments of 2003 represent positive growth within the SCO 
and concrete developments towards an emerging regional identity.  It is important to note 
that these developments came at a time when Sino-Russian relations were focused 
outward on U.S. actions in Iraq and Afghanistan and not on the regular intra-regional 
points of contention that inhibited SCO growth at times during the previous few years. 
January 15, 2004, saw the “establishment of a Permanent Secretariat in 
Beijing.”142  Even though this position has remained administrative in nature, it has 
provided the bureaucratic foundation for the policies and agreements that continue to be 
negotiated on during high-level meetings of the SCO.143  This also became the year when 
the question of membership expansion and criterion began to emerge as a point of 
disagreement.  With the inclusion of Mongolia as an observer in 2004, a point of 
contention began to resurface in the Sino-Russian relationship and within the SCO.144  It 
centered on the direction and the identity of the SCO moving forward into the second half 
of the decade and would reinforce the divergence between the geopolitically centric 
agenda of Moscow and the economically centric interests of Beijing. 
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The first half of the decade saw the official beginning of the SCO as a multilateral 
region organization in Central Asia in response to strengthening Sino-Russian relations, 
the resolution of regional border issues, and converging interests centering one stability 
and security in the region.  The events of September Eleventh created a dramatic change 
in Sino-Russian relational dynamics, as well as in each state’s policies towards the region 
and each other.  For the Russians, it marked a shift towards the West in support of the 
GWOT and its own self-interest.  The Russian Federation’s gradual shift back to the East 
came as it became apparent that the United States would continue to have an active 
military presence in the region for much longer than anticipated.  For the Chinese, the 
Russian policy shift to the West and back again in the span of a few years demonstrated a 
pattern of unreliability.  It reinforced the need for a more flexible and active policy in 
Central Asia and in the SCO.  It also became clear that China would have to be prepared 
for the possible re-emergence of a “new great game” in Central Asia.   
As will be discussed in the next subsection, the realities of Sino-Russian relations 
in Central Asia as well as the residue of events since September Eleventh will continue to 
shape interactions in the SCO and the region.  Issues surrounding membership expansion 
and norms, perceptions of U.S. regional encroachment and interference in domestic 
affairs, and Russian actions in The Republic of Georgia will also emerge as points of 
solidarity and friction in the Sino-Russian relationship.  These issues, as well as the 
realities inherent in their bilateral relationship, will continue to demonstrate the “tug-of-
war” between Russia and China in the SCO and in Central Asia. 
2. 2005–2009 
The year 2005 was a year of growth and development in the SCO, but it was also 
a year in which its potential expansion beyond the original six member states emerged as 
a topic of debate and contention, especially between China and Russia.  Four 
developments signified the positive and negative potential inherent in the SCOs 
developmental path, as well as the substantial influence of Sino-Russian relations on the 
organizations direction and identity.  First, India, Pakistan, and Iran were given observer 
status in the organization.  Second, an eight-day joint military exercise termed “Peace 
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Mission 2005” started in Vladivostok and concluded in Weifang.145  Third, although 
officially becoming operational only in 2003, RATS began to show tangible results 
within Central Asia.  Finally, the U.S. condemnation of Uzbekistan’s actions surrounding 
its military crackdown on protesters in Andijan spurred an SCO-supported call for a 
“final timeline” for the withdrawal of U.S. military forces from bases in Uzbekistan and 
Kyrgyzstan.146 
The inclusion of India, Pakistan, and Iran as observers in the SCO was a concrete 
expression of the contention in Sino-Russian relations in Central Asia.147  Each state’s 
inclusion as an observer demonstrated the Sino-Russian tug-of-war over the SCOs long-
term regional identity and direction.  The inclusion of India indicated a desire by Russia 
to counter the growing Chinese influence in the region, especially in the economic 
sphere.  The Indo-Russian relationship was “grounded in extensive military cooperation, 
buttressed by a shared vision of the contours of a desirable international order and a 
congruence of views on important issues related to regional and international 
security.”148 A full Indian membership in the SCO would offer a significant 
counterweight to Chinese interests in Central Asia.  For China, the inclusion of Pakistan 
served the purpose of balancing against Indo-Russian interests in the SCO and in Central 
Asia more generally.  The Chinese and the Pakistanis have enjoyed close to fifty years of 
strong relations and engagement in significant military and economic cooperation.149   
The inclusion of Iran as an observer created the most controversy over 
membership and the SCO’s identity.  Although it would expand the “cooperative 
potential” of the resource and energy trade in the SCO, it would also send a statement to 
the West that the SCO was overtly anti-Western and inherently supported Iran’s nuclear 
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development.150  The economic potential and the political ramifications of Iran’s 
membership in the SCO were not mutually exclusive.  Its membership would serve 
Russia’s geopolitical interests and hurt China’s international identity as a peaceful “status 
quo” power at the same time.  It was an issue that came to a head during the following 
year’s SCO summit in Shanghai. 
Peace Mission 2005 was touted as a joint counterterrorism exercise against the 
three evils.  General Liang Guanglie, Chief of the General Staff of the Chinese People's 
Liberation Army, stated that “they were part of the fight against international terrorism, 
separatism and extremism.”151  Many analysts and observers believed the bilateral 
exercises, attended by observers from the four original member states and Iran, Pakistan, 
and India, were utilized as a geopolitical tool by both states to send different messages 
concerning East Asia.   
For Russia, some analysts believed it wanted to send a message to “Japan, North 
Korea, and the Russian Far East that it was not abandoning the Far East and still had the 
capability to intervene in the area.”152  For China, other analysts believed these exercises 
sent a message to Japan about its increasing naval capabilities and its ability to intervene 
in any military disputes over the Kuril Islands.  It was also believed to have been a way to 
send a message to the North Koreans that a continued absence for the Six-Party talks 
would not be tolerated.153  Additionally, some circles believed that it demonstrated 
“Moscow’s willingness to lend a mail-glove hand to China’s efforts to warn the United 
States away from involvement in any future crisis over Taiwan.”154  Each of these 
conclusions may contain elements of truth, but—regardless of the specific objectives of 
China and Russia—the exercise clearly included or sent a greater regional geopolitical 
signal under the guise of an SCO mandate. 
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The tangible accomplishments of RATS in 2005 became a point of pride and one 
of the few symbols of tangible progress in member state cooperation against the three 
evils.  It was also one of the few concrete institutional points of development that the 
SCO could point to in its short history thus far.  By the beginning of the year, RATS was 
“operating a regional terrorist database, sponsoring joint counter-insurgency exercises 
and expert research, and providing Chinese security services with an institutional link to 
the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) Anti-Terrorist Centre in Bishkek.”155  
Vyacheslov Kasymov, the former Executive Committee Director of RATS, stated that 
“over 250 terror attacks were pre-empted in the SCO’s member states in 2005.”156  It 
also had the added benefit of reducing regional tensions and allowing states to focus on 
other positive initiativ
Although RATS was viewed as a modest development from a Western 
perspective, it was a significant development for the SCO.  The evolution of RATS into a 
viable SCO organ by 2005 occurred because of convergent Sino-Russian interests in 
battling the three evils.  This created an institutional environment that facilitated 
unimpeded growth.  The development of RATS was another example of the regional 
potential inherent within the SCO when Sino-Russian relations remained mutually 
supportive.  It was also additional evidence of how dramatically cooperation and 
contention in Sino-Russian relations affected the growth and development of the SCO. 
Repeated criticisms from the United States and the West concerning the events in 
May in Andijan, Uzbekistan came at time when the Central Asian Republics, as well as 
China and Russia, were growing wary of the U.S. military presence in the region.  The 
member states of the SCO were becoming leery about the continued U.S. democratic 
rhetoric aimed at the semi-authoritarian and authoritarian regimes in the region.  There 
were also suspicions among some of the member states concerning U.S. complicity in the  
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color revolutions in Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan.157  This growing anti-U.S. 
sentiment spurred the Astana declaration during the 2005 Heads of State summit in 
Kazakhstan.   
During the summit, “the six-nation body issued a declaration that the coalition 
forces give ‘a final timeline’ for their use of bases in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan.”158  It 
also called for “the establishment of true partnership with no pretence to monopoly and 
domination in international affairs.”159  This statement was a broader indictment of the 
United State’s democratization agenda.  Many analysts viewed this as a move initiated by 
Sino-Russian interests, but it was also rooted in Central Asian fears and resentment over 
the United State’s perceived democratization agenda and the recent color revolutions that 
brought the possibility of regime change closer to home for many leaders.  By October, 
U.S. troops had vacated the Uzbekistani base at Karshi-Khanabad but had come to an 
agreement with Kyrgyzstan to remain at the Manas airbase.  The United States had 
managed to overturn Kyrgyzstan’s original declaration as part of the Astana summit.160  
From a positive perspective, the Astana declaration was evidence of the substantial 
influence wielded by Russia and China within the SCO when their interests converge.  It 
also illustrated the ability of the SCO to speak and act with one voice in certain 
situations.  That said, at the conclusion of events, Kyrgyzstan’s reversal-decision also 
signified the growing influence and power of the United States in Central Asia as well. 
The SCO’s fifth anniversary celebration and summit in Shanghai saw two 
significant developments.  First, statements written into the official declaration during the 
summit continued the recent trend of veiled anti-U.S. and defensive rhetoric that was 
prevalent during the previous year.  This rhetoric was reinforced by the public statements 
of several heads of state during the summit.  Finally, the question of membership  
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expansion and norms became a focal point in Shanghai with another debate over Iranian 
membership.  This had implications for the SCO’s long-term regional identity, as well as 
Sino-Russian relations. 
There were two reasons why veiled anti-U.S. rhetoric continued as part of the 
SCO’s strategic communication in 2006.  First, regional leaders remained apprehensive 
about U.S. foreign policy objectives in Central Asia.  Finally, for China and Russia, fears 
of strategic encirclement by the United States remained at the center of their convergent 
interests.  Sino-Russian worries about strategic encirclement combined with feelings of 
apprehension among the leaders of the Central Asian Republics and fueled much of the 
veiled anti-U.S. SCO rhetoric during this period.161  A pertinent example of this rhetoric 
could be seen in the first paragraph of Article III of the Declaration on the Fifth 
Anniversary of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization that states: 
Diversity of civilization and model of development must be respected and 
upheld. Differences in cultural traditions, political and social systems, 
values and model of development formed in the course of history should 
not be taken as pretexts to interfere in other countries' internal affairs. 
Model of social development should not be "exported." Differences in 
civilizations should be respected, and exchanges among civilizations 
should be conducted on an equal basis to draw on each other's strengths 
and enhance harmonious development.162 
The reference to “exported” social development was a clear allusion to the United States’ 
perceived interference in Central Asian domestic affairs and its democratization agenda.   
The issue of Iranian membership into the SCO came at a time when anti-U.S. 
sentiment among the member states within the SCO was at its apex.  Iran’s membership 
would send a strong political signal to the United States and the West and would make 
the SCO an openly anti-Western organization.  In the months preceding the SCO summit 
in Shanghai, “Iran was considered by many a lock for promotion from and observer state 
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to a full member state.”163  To the West’s relief and to President Mahmoud 
Ahmadinejad’s chagrin, Iran was not granted full membership status at the summit and 
remained in its observer status.  Although much of the SCO rhetoric over the previous 
year centered on non-interference from the West, the SCO did not want to imply its tacit 
support of Iran’s nuclear program as part of any future non-interference rhetoric.  This 
would most likely occur with Iran as a member state.164  Overall, the prospect of Iranian 
membership in the SCO caused immense unease in China and a level of uncertainty in 
Russia.  This was enough to block Iran’s bid for membership.  It would have sealed the 
SCO’s regional identity as overtly and decidedly anti-Western organization and would 
have put the Chinese at odds with its cultivated international identity as a “status quo” 
power. 
“Peace Mission 2007” and the signing of the “Treaty on Long-Term Good-
Neighborliness, Friendship and Cooperation between the Member States of the Shanghai 
Cooperation Organization” during the summit in Bishkek defined developments in 2007.  
The SCO-sponsored Peace Mission exercises continued to display a trend of Sino-
Russian domination with only “token” contributions for the other member states.165 
Limited interoperability and differences in doctrine and capabilities remained as recurring 
problems inherent with the evolution of the Peace Mission initiatives.166  Significantly, it 
represented the first time entire PLA units operated outside of China.  This exercise was a 
good test of its modernization efforts, its power projection capabilities, and its ability to 
provide adequate logistics support over long distances.167  The signing of the new 
friendship treaty represented the provision of a legal framework within the SCO.  It was 
designed to ensure continued cooperation among member states.” 168  Overall, 2007 
demonstrated some of the positive and negative aspects of development within the SCO.   
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From a positive perspective, the friendship treaty was another milestone in the 
institutional development of the SCO.  Negatively, Peace Mission 2007 continued to be 
Sino-Russian centric and demonstrated the inability of the two nations to work effectively 
in a combined forces environment.  
Two events in 2008 signified the limits of Russia’s ability to influence the 
direction and identity of the SCO.  First, during the early stages of the year, U.S. military 
forces began to return to Uzbekistan.  Although Karimov’s decision appeared to be 
“motivated by the deterioration of the situation in neighboring Afghanistan,” it was 
another signal to the Russians demonstrating the new trilateral dynamics of regional 
power sharing in Central Asia.169  Finally, Moscow’s intervention in the Republic of 
Georgia in support of Abkhaz and South Ossetian separatist’s caused contention within 
the SCO and friction with Kazakhstan.170  The other SCO member states refused to 
endorse Russian military action in Georgia and “China kept a low profile, refusing to 
endorse this at the SCO meeting that month [August] in Dushanbe.”171  Overall, Russian 
limitations regarding its influence became apparent as a result of the developments of 
2008.  The SCO was not co-opted into giving any type of international legitimacy to 
Russian actions in Georgia and avoided another possible stigmatization as an overtly anti-
Western regional entity. 
As the SCO entered 2009, the regional effects of the global economic crisis, the 
Russian Federation’s continued and emerging tensions with multiple member states, and 
the formation of a cooperative mechanism with NATO defined Central Asian regional 
dynamics during that year.  The significant decline in energy prices had a drastic impact 
on the economies of all the member states of the SCO with the exception of China.  
Moreover, residual tensions with Kazakhstan over Russian actions in Georgia and 
emerging tensions with Uzbekistan over “CSTO-related issues and the establishment of a 
Russian military base in Kyrgyzstan” also combined to diminish Russian influence in the 
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SCO.172  In addition to these developments, an international conference on Afghanistan 
held in Moscow raised the possibility of SCO-NATO cooperation in order to “strengthen 
stability” in Afghanistan.173  It formed a cooperative mechanism between the SCO and 
NATO on Afghanistan and signaled to West that the SCO was a regional organization 
based on cooperation, security, and stability and not on overt anti-Western rhetoric and 
behavior.  The developments of 2009 demonstrated yet another twist and turn in the Sino-
Russian tug-of-war in Central Asia and over the direction and identity of the SCO. 
Overall, the second half of the decade saw a continuation of the Sino-Russian 
“tug-of-war” over the SCO’s long-term direction and identity.  The SCO continued to 
shift back and forth from east-to-west as a consequence of Sino-Russian relational 
dynamics but was stopped short of being branded an anti-Western institution on multiple 
occasions.  Issues surrounding membership expansion and norms, perceived Western 
encroachment and interference in domestic affairs, the global economic crisis, and 
Russian aggression in Georgia continued to demonstrate the potential for solidarity and 
friction in the Sino-Russian relationship in the SCO and in Central Asia.   
In light of these developments, the SCO was able to continue its maturation 
process during the second half of the decade.  It made progress in its mandate to fight the 
“three evils” with the development of RATS and in its development of a legal framework 
to hold its member states accountable.  It also identified itself as a possible partner for 
NATO in working towards a solution in Afghanistan.  The SCO displayed its potential as 
a regional organization on multiple occasions from 2005-2009.  It is notable that this only 
occurred during times of convergent Sino-Russian interest in the region, or when they 
were distracted by issues in Iraq and Afghanistan.  
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C. TRENDS AND ISSUES 
Sino-Russian relations in Central Asia and in the SCO have veered between 
cooperation and competition since the turn of the century.  The presence of the United 
States and NATO in Central Asia since 2001 has given each state a focal point of 
convergence that has alleviated some of the strategic pressure for increased Sino-Russian 
competition in the near-term.  It will be interesting to see how the eventual removal of 
Western military forces from Central Asia will affect the Sino-Russian “strategic 
partnership” in the future.  Based on their history in the SCO up to this point, it will likely 
create a more contentious period of Sino-Russian geopolitics as both states become more 
assertive in the pursuit of their regional interests.174  For now though, Russian and 
Chinese interests still converge on minimizing U.S. influence and maintaining a stable 
and secure regional environment.  This will remain as the status quo in Central Asia as 
long as the United States and NATO remain, just as the “three evils” remain a cause for 
concern among all of the member states of the SCO. 
Within this relatively stable regional construct, Sino-Russian competition will 
continue to occur in two significant areas.  First, competition over energy and Chinese 
access to markets will continue to define the bulk of Sino-Russian economic competition 
in the region.  Russia has failed to stop the Chinese economic “charm offensive” in 
Central Asia so far.  China has become an indispensible economic partner to the states of 
Central Asia.  “Beijing is on track to surpass Moscow in its trade flows with Central 
Asia: In 2008, trade between China and Central Asia exceeded $25 billion, while trade 
between Russia and Central Asia was $27 billion.”175  Second, Intra-organizational 
competition will continue to occur as part of the larger contestation over the direction and 
identity of the SCO.  The Russian Federation remains “lukewarm” toward the SCO due 
to significant Chinese economic dynamism and influence.176  Russia will continue to tout  
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other organizations, such as the CSTO, as viable alternatives to the growth and 
development of the SCO as the leading regional manifestation of cooperation and 
collective security in Central Asia.   
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IV. SINO-RUSSIAN ARMS SALES 
A. BACKGROUND 
The history of Russian military cooperation and assistance to China has its roots 
in the Chinese civil war period leading up to the establishment of the People’s Republic 
of China (PRC) in 1949.  As early as the 1920s, limited Soviet assistance, in the form of 
advisors and equipment, was given to the Guomindang (GMD) and the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP).177  The Soviets also provided military assistance to Chiang 
Kai-shek and his forces from 1937–1940 in order to fight the imperial aggression of the 
Japanese in Manchuria.  At the conclusion of World War II (WWII), Soviet assistance “in 
the form of Japanese weapons, communications equipment, and money to equip the 
CCP” was given on a limited basis to continue the civil war against the GMD.178  In 
1948, as it was becoming apparent that the CCP was successfully eroding the power of 
the GMD, Soviet backing remained limited but grew to include “radio communications 
assistance, transports to assist with troop movements, and air defense support.”179 Soviet 
assistance proved vital to CCP efforts to consolidate power in China.  It was also a 
contributing factor in the fleeing of the GMD to Taiwan and the CCP establishment of 
the PRC. 
Within a year, the onset of the Korean War provided the first Chinese impetus to 
begin modernization efforts for the People’s Liberation Army (PLA).  The PLA had 
retained significant vestiges of military equipment from the GMD during the civil war 
but subsequent operations during the initial stages of the Korean War demonstrated that 
its forces were severely hindered by “deficiencies in logistics and ordnance.”180  The 
Soviets were the likely choice to assist with Chinese modernization efforts due to 
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geographical proximity, similar ideologies, and the availability of modern weapons, 
equipment, and training.  To illustrate this point, John Gittings, in The Role of the 
Chinese Army, states: 
No serious attempt was made to start the modernization of the PLA before 
the Korean War, in spite of rumors of a secret Sino-Soviet military 
agreement which could include substantial retraining and re-equipment.  
In celebrations for Army Day in August 1950 modernization was hardly 
mentioned at all.  The key to modernization was in the hands of the Soviet 
Union, and it was China’s intervention in Korea which opened the flood 
gates of Soviet Aid.181 
Although initial Soviet military assistance and the provision of weapons and equipment 
did not meet Chinese expectations during the first year of the conflict, Sino-Soviet 
military links still began to emerge.182  The relationship strengthened in 1952 as military 
and technical cooperation with the Soviets became more substantial.  It was part of an 
overall trend of positive developments in Sino-Soviet relations during the first half of the 
1950s.183  
By the time of the truce on the Korean peninsula in 1953, the Sino-Soviet 
Alliance continued to strengthen on the foundation of shared ideologies and mutual 
suspicion of the West.  Tremendous Chinese enthusiasm for even more extensive military 
cooperative efforts was fueled by the United States’ policy of containment in the region 
and its relationship with Taiwan.184  Against this backdrop, military cooperation reached 
new heights in 1954.  For the Chinese, continuing financial flexibility from the Soviets as 
well as robust maintenance and technical assistance allowed the Chinese to procure and 
eventually operate modern military aircraft like the Mig-17 and some short-range missile 
systems.185  There were also initiatives for the licensing of production rights for Soviet 
military equipment in China.  These initiatives centered on developing a modern Chinese 
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defense industry similar to the Soviet model of production.  By 1956, the Chinese were 
producing MiG-17s in Manchurian factories with Soviet technical assistance.186 
Nuclear cooperation also became a component of military cooperation as the 
alliance reached the mid-point of the 1950s.  The Soviets began to train Chinese scientists 
to enable the start of indigenous nuclear research programs that had the potential for 
weapons applications.  The Soviets initially agreed to also provide the Chinese with a 
“prototype” for a nuclear weapon.  However, this initiative was later withdrawn as the 
relationship began to sour.187  Overall, considerable Soviet technical and scientific 
assistance was one of the contributing factors to the Chinese emergence as a nuclear 
power in October 1964. 
The seeds of acrimony in the Sino-Soviet alliance began to appear in the 
relationship around the middle of the decade over the Soviet declaration of a policy of 
“peaceful coexistence” with the West and problems in post-Stalin bloc relations.  In terms 
of military cooperation, tensions started in the latter part of the decade.  In 1958, Soviet 
proposals to the PRC began to transform bilateral tensions into a growing sense of 
paranoia about Soviet intentions regarding the PRC.188  For example, Soviet proposals to 
build a series of military facilities on Chinese soil were met with suspicion by Mao and 
his supporters.  These proposals included a long-wave radio station designed for early-
warning and long-range communications and a joint flotilla of nuclear-powered 
submarines based in China and designated “for a common defense in the Far East.”189  
These joint ventures would be Soviet-financed and built and would be operated by 
military personnel from both states.  Mao and his supporters looked at these overtures as 
an attempt to control the regime and impede the sovereignty of the PRC.  Overall, 
suspicions concerning military cooperation and the provision of equipment and training 
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were one of a myriad of issues that led to the Sino-Soviet split and the subsequent thirty 
year period of cold and acrimonious relations that was about to unfold. 
Although the 1960 withdrawal of most Soviet aid and technical support signaled 
the first tangible manifestation of the Sino-Soviet split, limited military cooperation 
occurred in some instances until 1963.190  A late as “January of 1963, some cooperation 
in the form of training and assistance in the production of the MiG-21 continued” until 
tensions built to an untenable level for any bilateral military cooperation to proceed 
further.  With the Soviet withdrawal complete and the militarization of the Sino-Soviet 
border, bilateral military cooperation in any form would not begin again until 1990.   
It was clear that the massive pullout of Soviet technical and military advisors had 
a dramatic effect on the indigenous development of the Chinese defense-industrial 
complex.  The Soviets had played a significant role in the PLA’s modernization drive, the 
building of its nuclear program, and in providing the foundation for the development of 
its defense industry.191  Unfortunately for the Chinese, substantial Soviet assistance was 
one of the major reasons “for the backwardness of the Chinese armed forces in the 1960s 
and 1970s.”192  The Chinese defense industry became disjointed without heavy Soviet 
involvement and was only able to develop successful indigenous weapons programs in a 
few areas.193  Its backwards nature was exacerbated by tumultuous domestic events that 
unfolded almost non-stop until the death of Mao in 1976.   
Overall, as the 1950s progressed, and especially after Stalin’s death, the Chinese 
had demonstrated an “ability to win military, political, and economic concessions from 
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peration as the relationship move forward. 
                                                
This highlighted an important trend that emerged in Sino-Russian military cooperation in 
the 1950s, which would permeate bilateral dealings again during the 1990s and emerge as 
a major point of contention by the mid-2000s.   
Sino-Russian military cooperation began anew during the final days of the Soviet 
Union.195  In “April 1990, the first Chinese military delegation in thirty years visited 
Moscow.”196  By June, both sides had an agreed upon framework for the purchase of 
four Su-27s.197  In addition, 1990 saw the Chinese order twenty-four Mi-17 
helicopters.198  With the establishment of the Russian Federation (RF) in 1991, Sino-
Russian military cooperation became known as “military-technical cooperation (MTC).”  
Wilson defines this as “the Russian sale of weaponry and its related technologies to 
China.”199  This is the context the term will be used in throughout the discussion.  In 
December 1992, due to convergent interests and the rapid evolution of military 
cooperative endeavors, a “Memorandum on Principles of Military-Technical 
Cooperation” was signed during Yeltsin’s visit to Beijing.  It included the purchase of 
Su-27s, S-300 air defense systems, and spare parts for old Soviet military equipment still 
in use by the PLA.  The agreement also allowed for Russian military and technical 
advisors to enter the PRC again as well as Chinese military personnel to attend Russian 
military schools.200  Overall, it provided an agreed upon framework for Sino-Russian 
arms sales and technical coo
For the Chinese, the agreement on MTC came at a crucial time.  The Tiananmen 
Square massacre in 1989 severely restricted the ability of the PLA to purchase military 
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hardware as a result of the Western arms embargoes that ensured.201  The United States’ 
performance during the Gulf War also had implications because it “refocused Chinese 
attention on the need for military power” as a supporting component of its economic 
aspirations.202  These factors made the Sino-Russian MTC agreement in 1992 a perfect 
solution to a complex international situation.  It provided the Chinese with several 
benefits that would allow it to support a multi-faceted military modernization strategy.  
This strategy would allow the PRC to take advantage of the RF’s desperate situation and 
support its doctrinal evolution towards fighting a “short-duration, high-intensity regional 
conflict” under modern conditions.203  
The Chinese multi-faceted approach contained short-and long-term goals.  In the 
short-term, the Chinese hoped to “expand procurement of Russian weapon systems and 
technical assistance.”204  In the long term, it “aspired to become self sufficient through 
the acquisition of key foreign dual-use technologies and knowledge.”205  The Russian 
defense-industrial complex would serve both of these purposes.  It filled the void left by 
Western arms restrictions and provided access to advanced technology, military 
equipment, and licensing for the indigenous production of military products that would 
support doctrinal change.  Russian military-technical assistance would also facilitate 
Chinese defense industrial transformation from “a sea of mediocrity, backwardness, and 
redundancy” into a self sufficient and competent domestic and international entity.206  In 
addition, it would significantly reduce the research and development (R&D) costs for  
China and allow it to focus its efforts on reverse engineering and the exploitation of dual-
use technology.207 
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From the Russian perspective, the MTC agreement in 1992 was also vital for its 
future.  The collapse of the Soviet Union and the “decline of Russian worldwide arms 
sales as a result of the defeat of the former Soviet client Iraq in the 1991 Gulf War” 
combined to put the RF’s defense sector in a state of desperation and near-collapse.208  
Russian fears were compounded by the sheer size of the post-Soviet defense-industrial 
complex.  It “comprised 1,600 defense enterprises that had a staff of nearly two million 
people.”209  There was no possibility of its survival strictly based on domestic 
procurement.  The Russian defense-industrial complex needed to build a robust export 
market to have any hope of avoiding the calamitous effects of a widespread collapse.210  
For example, “from 1992–1999 the RF produced two ships for domestic procurement and 
11 for export, 31 tanks for domestic purposes and 433 for export, and seven aircraft for 
domestic procurement and 278 for export.”211 Overall, these factors combined to make 
the 1992 MTC with China vital to the Russian military-industrial complex’s survival and 
to the sustainment of an economy that was in “systemic depression” and would lose half 
of its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) during the 1990s.212   
In addition to defense-industrial and economic survival, the MTC with China had 
other positive effects.  First, it provided money for R&D efforts to continue within the 
defense-industrial sector.  This allowed for the development of next-generation weapons 
for the Russian armed forces and modest domestic procurement while it continued to sell 
Soviet-era weapons systems to the Chinese.213  Second, it provided the necessary capital 
to sustain some semblance of a professional military.  It was already apparent that the RF 
could not financially support the post-Soviet force structure as it stood.  Capital from 
weapons sales allowed the Russian Ministry of Defense (MOD) to support a reduced 
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force structure and some force modernization as the 1990s moved forward.214  Finally, 
sustained MTC ensured, at least in the short-term, a friendly China that would “avert 
threats across its Asian frontiers where its military power was eroding daily.”215  This 
final point is important because it is one that threatens all facets of Sino-Russian relations 
due to Russian insecurities, xenophobia, and its historical sense of strategic entitlement. 
The onset of Sino-Russian MTC in 1992 and its evolution throughout the 1990s 
demonstrated a number of trends that continued into the twenty-first century.  It also gave 
rise to several points of contention that remained as well.  Each of these aspects provides 
an insight into the evolution and of Sino-Russian MTC during the first decade of the 
twenty-first century.  They also provide indications for the future of Sino-Russian MTC 
and the overall relationship moving forward. 
There were two significant trends in Sino-Russian MTC during the 1990s.  First,  
Beijing reportedly purchased, on average, some $1.2 billion worth of 
Russian weapons each year during the 1990s, accounting for the dominant 
percentage of total Russian arms exports.”216   
Overall, Russia “supplied over 85 percent of all of China’s arms since the 
1990s.217   
Within this context, Russian arms sales to China increased significantly starting in the 
mid-1990s.  Vidya Nadkarni provides data that supports this trend: 
China’s military spending rose commensurately during the late 1990s to finance 
its arms imports.  Even though military expenditures hovered between 1.6 and 2.1 
percent of annual GDP after the mid-1990s, China’s double-digit rate of GDP 
growth fueled a robust military buildup.  Moreover, official defense budget 
figures, according to a US Defense Department report, do not include several 
large categories of expenditure.218 
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This trend would continue into the 2000s.  Second, a gradual shift in Beijing’s 
procurement focus occurred during the late 1990s.  “Beijing continued to ratchet up 
pressure on Russian firms to sell it design technology instead of military hardware.” 219  
Increased Chinese desires for later generation technology was commensurate with its 
desire to field modern armed forces on par with the West and the development of a self 
sufficient and globally competitive defense industry.  
As the Chinese economy continued to grow and its indigenous defense became 
more sophisticated, Chinese desires for licensing and joint-venture projects continued to 
increase as well.  During the late 1990s, it began to develop into a serious competitor for 
Russia in the developing world arms market.220  These developments were indicative of 
the Chinese long-term desire to minimize dependence on Soviet-era Russian arms and 
technical assistance and build its own robust arms export market in the process.  Overall, 
these factors combined over time to put pressure on Russian defense industries and have 
been exacerbated by fears of the European Union (EU) lifting the embargoes from 
1989.221  This complex dynamic continued into the twenty-first century and evolved into 
the main point of contention within Sino-Russian MTC interactions. 
Two points of contention developed in the 1990s with respect to Sino-Russian 
MTC. First, and most importantly, “China continued to remain piqued at Russia’s refusal 
to sell weapons systems that Moscow had been willing to sell to India.”222  In addition, 
Chinese interests began to shift toward the procurement of more advanced weapons 
systems with a greater potential for offensive power projection.223  As Chinese desires 
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shifted to the appropriation of technology in the mid to late-1990s, the RF, due to 
commercial and military concerns in several areas, began to resist PRC proposals.   
Commercial concerns pertained to suspect behavior with regards to intellectual 
property and the emerging competition for the developing world’s arms export markets 
became issues that would eventually put the states at loggerheads in the late-2000s.  
Militarily, apprehension over a developing “China threat,” with Russian military 
assistance, remained as a fear in some Russian circles as well.  It was not a widely held 
fear in Russian military and policy circles during the 1990s or beyond but began to 
receive more unofficial attention in the Kremlin as the 2000s moved forward.224  Overall, 
these issues would combine to outweigh financial considerations in more and more 
situations as the 2000s progressed and all stem from Russian unwillingness to provide the 
most advanced technology available and the Chinese desire to move past the acquisition 
of Soviet-era military products.     
Russian refusals to supply the Chinese defense industry with the latest military 
technology also raised two larger questions.  The first concerned the limits of Chinese 
influence in getting what it needed from its Russian counterparts to support its long-term 
goal of self-reliance.  This would have implications for its need to start looking at other 
avenues for procurement as the 2000s progressed.  The second centered on how much 
longer MTC would remain as one of the foundations of the Sino-Russian strategic 
partnership and how much longer it would work under the 1992 framework.  Each of 
these considerations continued to play a role in Sino-Russian MTC during the next 
decade and have implications for the relationship moving forward. 
Finally, the second point of contention surrounding Sino-Russian MTC involved 
the use of bartering.  Initially, in the early 1990s, the PRC was able to procure relatively 
advanced weapons systems on favorable terms.  China’s initial procurement deals for the 
Su-27 and the Kilo-class submarine illustrate this dynamic.   “China paid for two-thirds 
of the total cost of the first contract for the Su-27 Flanker aircraft and half of the total cost 
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of the first Kilo-class submarines through the use of barter.”225  This arrangement 
allowed the Chinese to send cheap consumer goods and foodstuffs as payment for 
advanced weaponry.  As part of the Su-27 and Kilo-class submarine procurement deals 
mentioned earlier, “24,000 tons of canned meat was delivered to the Sukhoi aircraft plant 
in Komsomolsk-na-Amur in the RFE and several pallets of plastic lighters were sent to 
the Admiraltieskie Wharf shipyards in St. Petersburg.”226  It was an advantageous 
arrangement for the Chinese.   
Between 1993 and 1994, as the issue became more contentious, the RF began to 
demand payments for weapons sales in cash.  By the late 1990s, MTC issues concerning 
“hard currency payments” were alleviated as a major point of contention.227  This issue 
remains important though because it surfaced again in the energy sector as the Russian 
economy began to feel the effects of the global financial crisis.  In a wider economic 
context, it is also important to note that deals of this nature created a sense of hostility 
among the Russian population.  They exacerbated feelings of xenophobia and strategic 
entitlement because many Russians felt exploited by the Chinese at a time of Russian 
insecurity.  It is an issue that has implications for MTC and the overall dynamics of the 
Sino-Russian partnership moving forward. 
Overall, the 1990s was a defining moment in the emergence of Sino-Russian 
MTC.  It strengthened the Sino-Russian “strategic partnership” at a time when both states 
were experiencing international difficulties and were coming to terms with their future 
positions in the fact-approaching twenty-first century international system.  As will be 
discussed in the next section, the trends and points of friction highlighted earlier will 
begin to play a larger role in MTC interactions during the first decade of the twenty-first 
century.  The broader questions alluded to earlier will also begin to come to the forefront 
of MTC interactions and will have implications as well.   
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B. SINO-RUSSIAN INTERACTIONS 
Sino-Russian MTC trends saw a dramatic rise in interactions during the first half 
of the decade.228  This five-year period marks the apex of Sino-Russian MTC to date.  It 
was a continuation of an already significant increase in arms sales that began to occur 
during the second half of the 1990s.  After 2006, a gradual decrease began to occur for 
several reasons that were alluded to in the previous section.  These trends and points of 
contention will be focused on in more detail in the forthcoming subsections.  Overall, the 
decline becomes quite dramatic in the latter part of the decade.  For example, Nadkarni 
states: 
Thus, whereas 70 percent of Russia’s arms exports were destined for 
China in the late 1990s, China’s share fell to 45 percent of Russia’s total 
arms exports in 2007.  While the 2007 figure is still significant, no new 
major arms deals are being negotiated or planned. Beijing has invested 
strongly in the development and production of indigenous weapons 
systems in order to decrease reliance on foreign suppliers.229  
This is an indication that Sino-Russian MTC is approaching a crossroads or is already at 
it depending on how the situation is perceived.  Providing a detailed chronology of the 
previous decade will shed additional light on the previously discussed evolutionary 
patterns as well as the points of contention that have continued to remain pertinent to the 
present day.  The following subsection will focus on Sino-Russian MTC trends and issues 
from 2000-2004. 
1. 2000–2004   
The first year of the twenty-first century was extremely productive in terms of 
Sino-Russian MTC.  In Russia, with Vladimir Putin’s election, the domestic political 
environment grew more conducive to long-term growth for MTC with several initiatives.  
For example, in January, Moscow “reportedly signed a 15-year Military Cooperation 
Plan with Beijing that envisaged increased arms sales, license transfers, and joint research 
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and development.”230  In May, Putin overturned an earlier decision by Yeltsin to “limit 
Russian military assistance to other countries.”231 Putin seemed to be cultivating a 
domestic political environment that would allow Sino-Russian MTC to move to new 
levels and increase Russia growing profit margins in the process.   From a domestic 
standpoint, he made a July announcement to raise the RF’s government budget for 
domestic procurement by 50 percent.232  It was designed to stimulate domestic demand 
again as the Russian military attempted to recover from the dramatic erosion of 
equipment and capabilities that occurred in the 1990s.  The budget increase was also 
designed to slow down a growing imbalance between the domestic and export arms 
markets that had the potential to cause negative long-term effects.   
Additionally, Putin worked to merge a myriad of arms export agencies as part of 
his burgeoning domestic policy of recentralization.  His intention was to minimize the 
effects of continued Soviet-era inefficiency and battle the rampant corruption that 
plagued significant sectors of Russia’s defense-industrial complex.  Putin attempted to 
ensure these changes would occur by making an institutional change to the “Supervisory 
Commission on Military-Technical Cooperation with Foreign States.”233  He mandated 
that the “president and not the prime minister would sit as its chair” in all future 
sessions.234  Overall, Vladimir Putin and the RF seemed poised to take advantage of the 
continued surge in arms sales to the Chinese.  
In China, several positive developments transpired.  According to the Stockholm 
International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), China became the world’s largest 
importer of weapons with over $2 billion in total arms imports in 2001.235  Of this total, 
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$1.7 billion or 85 percent of total Chinese expenditures were for Russian military 
products.236  This signaled a strong and robust trend in the growth of Sino-Russian MTC 
during the early twenty-first century.   
In addition to the substantial import numbers, “as many as 2,000 Russian 
technicians were employed by Chinese research institutes working on laser technology, 
the miniaturization of nuclear weapons, cruise missiles, space-based weaponry, and 
nuclear submarines.”237  It is hard to ascertain how many of these were part of MTC 
efforts and how many were just working for the Chinese due to the economic desperation 
in Russia’s defense-industrial sector during the 1990s.  Nonetheless, it still represents a 
significant integration of Chinese defense industries and Russian workers at a time when 
MTC interactions were still filled with long-term promise. 
The year 2001 continued the positive trends of the previous year.  China remained 
the world’s largest importer of arms and Russia remained its largest supplier. Growth was 
tremendous during this period as well.  Procurements by China grew by more than 50 
percent from the previous year.  In addition, projections for 2002 were looking just as 
positive.238  Overall, MTC expenditures rose to over $3 billion.239  PRC arms 
procurement agreements included 38 Su-30MKK fighters, four battalions of S-300PMU1 
(SA-10A) surface-to-air (SAM) systems, and 35 Mi-17V5 helicopters.240  The Russian 
defense-industrial complex was benefitting strongly from increased demand for Russian 
military equipment and technology. 
In 2002, a major weapons deal, totaling over $4 billion, was announced between 
the Chinese and the Russians.  The deal included “two more Sovremenny-class 
destroyers priced at a total of $1.4 billion, eight Kilo-class submarines for $1.5 billion, 
 
236 See SIPRI TIV of arms imports to China, 2000–2001 for additional information. 
237 John Pomfret, “Russians Help China Modernize Its Arsenal; New Military Ties Raise U.S. 
Concerns,” The Washington Post, February 10, 2000, A17. 
238 Alexander Nemets, “War Does Not Curtail the Growing Russia–China Alliance” China Brief 2, 
no. 1 (January 2002): 2. 
239 See SIPRI TIV of arms imports to China, 2001–2002 for additional information. 
240 See PRC Arms Acquisitions from Russia (pre-2005) (accessed July 7, 2010); available from 
http://www.sinodefence.com/special/arms-trade/import-russia-pre2005.asp. 
 67
                                                
and up to 40 more Su-30 fighter-bombers valued at about $1.8 billion.”241  It was the 
largest bilateral procurement deal ever signed by the two states.   
In another significant development, the “2002 Annual Report to Congress on the 
Military Power of the People’s Republic of China” stated that:  
In March 2002, Chinese finance minister Xiang Huaicheng announced that 
China was increasing military spending in 2002 by 17.6 percent, or $3 
billion, bringing the publicly reported total to $20 billion. The publicly 
disclosed figure does not include major spending for weapons research 
and for the purchase of foreign weapons like two Russian-built destroyers 
China bought last year. Actual military spending, including the large but 
difficult-to-assess off budget financing portion, could total $65 billion, 
making China the second largest defense spender in the world after the 
United States and the largest defense spender in Asia.242 
Estimates like this, at a time when billions of dollars were being spent annually on 
weapons procurement in China, began to stimulate unofficial worry among some 
government officials in the Kremlin.  Long-term fears of an emerging “China threat,” 
long relegated to academic debate and the nationalistic fringe elements of politics, began 
to receive unofficial attention among mainstream government officials in the Kremlin.243 
In 2002, Izvestiya reported the following from government sources: 
An awareness of the “China problem” has reached all government 
departments even including supporters of a multipolar world.  This is not 
publicly spoken of, but high-ranking Russian officials admit unofficially 
that in seven to ten years’ time China will become a key problem for 
Russia. “Just imagine one and a half billion armed Chinese along our 
border!”  Both military men and diplomats say with a shudder.244 
The long-term implications for Sino-Russian MTC were in the back of everyone’s minds 
but remained there due to the substantial positive financial aspects associated with these 
interactions at this point in the decade. 
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Additionally, According to the “United Nations Register on Conventional 
Weapons,” the RF shipped more “individual weapons” to its customers than any other 
state in 2002.245  SIPRI reinforced this metric with its designation of the RF as the 
world’s  largest exporter of arms at over $5 billion, which accounted for almost 36 
percent of arms exports worldwide.246   Business was good for the Russian defense 
industrial  complex.    Overall,  these  emerging  dynamics  would  have  domestic  and 
international implications for Sino‐Russian MTC and the perceptions of both states 
regionally  and  globally  as  the  relationship  progressed  through  the  rest  of  the 
decade. 
As Russian coffers continued to swell from Chinese, as well as Indian 
procurement deals, debate within Russia in 2003 began to center on concerns that the 
Russian defense industrial complex was becoming complacent due to its resurgence over 
the past decade.  Former Defense Minister Vitaly Shlyikov stated “Russia’s defense 
industry has been living off the accumulated Soviet fat for the past decade, and now the 
banquet is ending.  Going by current trends, Russia will have no military industry within 
10 years.”247  Recent trends make his prediction not as remote as it seemed at the time.   
In many ways, the Russian defense-industrial sector depended on a narrow scope 
of big ticket items to entice China.  The majority of small but essential components of a 
functioning military were already produced indigenously by the PLA or outsourced to 
cheaper import markets than Russia.  These included items like ammunition and small 
arms.  Russian defense industries remained a niche market for China.  Their utility hinged 
on the ability to produce high technology military arms and equipment that was still 
beyond the PRC’s defense-industrial capabilities to produce comprehensively.   
Unfortunately, it was a dynamic that was beginning to change.  To illustrate this 
point, Richard Fisher, from the Center for Security Policy states: 
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For Russia, the strategic gamble it is taking is that it can develop the next 
generation of military technology before China can master the current 
generation, and thus, remain dependent on Russia for cutting edge 
technologies.  To an increasing degree Russia is also taking this gamble 
with India.  Many Russian are confident they can remain well ahead of 
China and India.  But some Russian sources at Moscow Aerospace Salon 
(MAKS) indicate that china in some cases may be able to master new 
technologies faster than previously expected, and thus, pose a commercial 
in addition to a possible military threat.  But for now Russia is getting 
funding and making new systems which in many cases its own military 
forces cannot afford to use.248 
In light of these prospects, the RF remained hesitant to share its latest military 
technologies with the PRC.  The Chinese, as indicative of the emerging trend in the late 
1990s, were becoming increasingly adamant about the acquisition of military technology 
through licensing and joint ventures.  Russian arms procurements were continuing to 
meet some niche needs but the acquisition of advanced Russian technology in order to 
develop a self sufficient and globally competitive defense industry were part of its long-
term goals.  Consequently, the Chinese were reaching a saturation point with acquisition 
of Soviet-era military technology and the short-term utility of Sino-Russian MTC under 
the current model.  As Kislov and Frolov state, “At the present stage it [PRC] remains 
ready to buy, but this is not going to last forever.”249  
In 2004, Russia moved to second place, behind the United States, in global arms 
exports at over $6 billion.  China remained the largest importer of arms spending over $3 
billion on arms procurement initiatives.250  Overall, Sino-Russian MTC accounted for 
$2.83 billion and close to 50 percent of total Russian exports globally during this year.251  
From all outward appearances, the Sino-Russian MTC remained strong.   
 
248 See Richard D. Fisher, “New Developments in Russia–China Military Relations: A Report on the 
August 19–23 2003 Moscow Aerospace Salon (MAKS),” prepared for the U.S–China Economic and 
Security and Review Commission (accessed July 14, 2010); available from   
http://www.uscc.gov/researchpapers/2000_2003/reports/mair1.htm. 
249 A. Kislov and A. Frolov, “Russia in the World Arms Market,” International Affairs 49, no. 4 
(August 2003): 147. 
250 See SIPRI Arms Transfer database and Military Expenditure database 2004–2005 for additional 
information.  
251 See SIPRI TIV of Arms Exports from Russia 2004–2005 for additional information. 
 70
                                                
In spite of the strong financial aspects for Russia and the continued fulfillment of 
certain niche needs for China, points of contention over the transfer of more advance 
technology continued to plaque the relationship.  It becomes more of an issue during the 
second half of the decade as delays in deliveries and questions over quality begin to cause 
discord as well.  These points of contention were exacerbated by Russian complaints over 
intellectual property rights and charges of wide-spread Chinese cloning of Russian 
weapons systems.  The RF believed these practices were giving the Chinese a more 
competitive foothold as an attractive state for arms purchases in the developing world.  
The next subsection will detail these trends and the implications of these issues within 
MTC from 2005-2009. 
2. 2005–2009  
In 2005, China remained Russia’s largest military customer.  Purchases during the 
year included 100 AL-31FN turbofan engines for China’s J-10 fighter program, 30 IL-
76MD transport aircraft, and four IL-78 tankers.252  According to the 2005 Congressional 
“Report on the Military Power of the People’s Republic of China,” the PRC was 
“negotiating the purchase of additional surface-to-air missiles, combat aircraft, aircraft 
engines, and assault and transport helicopters.”253  Russian imports levels to China 
remained strong and ended the year at over $3 billion.254   
The 2005 Pentagon report also stated that “according to intelligence community 
estimates, China’s defense industries were still inefficient and dependent on foreign 
suppliers for key technologies.”255  This was an interesting assessment and came at a 
time when the EU came close to rescinding its arms embargo against the PRC.  Human 
rights concerns among a few European nations and U.S. pressure derailed the consensus 
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needed to overturn the decision.256  Although nothing changed, it raised Russian fears of 
the emergence of a competing Western arms market in the near future.  It had the 
potential to cost the Russian defense-industrial sector several billion dollars based on 
MTC trends over the previous decade.  In light of this development, the RF still refused 
to acquiesce to Chinese demands for advanced military technology.  Russian refusals, 
however, finally began to spur tangible changes in Sino-Russian MTC beginning in 2006. 
Although Russian arms exports to China reached their highest historical levels at 
$3.5 billion, Chinese procurement orders began to slow down in 2006.257  According to 
the Web site Sinodefence, China only finalized one procurement order for eight battalions 
of S-300PMU2 SAMs totaling around $1 billion in 2006.258  This was the start of a 
disturbing trend for the Russian defense-industrial sector as the decade moved forward 
and was the result of two main factors.   First, according to some analysts, “China was 
saturated with Russian arms, not only numerically, but also qualitatively.”259  This 
situation combined with the second factor, Russian refusals to meet certain technological 
needs of the PRC, to motivate it to look at other markets, most notably Israel, for future 
needs. 
In 2007, China’s published defense budget increased by close to 20 percent over 
the previous year.260  It was an indication that military modernization was still a focal 
point of the PRC.  Conversely, Chinese procurement orders to Russia continued to 
dwindle during this same period.  The Chinese only finalized one procurement order with 
the RF totaling about $240 million in 2007.261  Russian exports to China also dropped by 
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over $2 billion from the previous year, and finished at $1.2 billion.262  That is a monetary 
decrease of over 60 percent.  In an article from Rianovosti, a Russian news source, states:  
Beijing says it no longer needs relatively ineffective Russian weapons 
without the relevant production licenses, and that Moscow should start 
selling more advanced, hard-hitting and hi-tech weaponry and military 
equipment. Most importantly, China wants to launch more joint 
production efforts to receive state-of-the-art defense technologies, 
inventions and composite materials.263 
It became evident that, while the PRC would continue focus a tremendous amount 
of fiscal resources on its modernization strategy, it would also begin to search for other 
options to fulfill its long-term needs due to the unwillingness of the RF to provide 
advance military technology.  Although the RF was still the largest provider of arms to 
the PRC in 2007, the percentage of Russian exports to China decreased from 40 percent 
of total exports in 2006 to 20 percent in 2007.264  It is important to remember that the 
number was over 70 percent during the late 1990s.  Chinese desires for more advanced 
technology were finally at a point where the agreed upon framework of the 1992 Sino-
Russian MTC agreement was no longer viable for meeting the PRC’s needs moving 
forward.  The military technology the RF was willing to sell was no longer adequate to 
meet Chinese demands.  
Issues surrounding three developments in 2007 exacerbated Sino-Soviet tensions 
regarding MTC.  First, delays in the scheduled delivery of 30 IL-76 and eight IL-78 
aircraft due to myriad problems caused the Chinese to delay meetings on defense 
cooperation.  Second, service-life issues concerning electronic equipment on previously 
delivered Su-27SK fighters caused the Chinese to raise public concerns over Russian 
arms reliability.  Finally, the Russians began to complain more vocally about issues 
surrounding the Chinese cloning of weapons systems and its negative implications for 
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possible arms deals to Iran and Pakistan.265  The issue surrounding Pakistan was 
exacerbated further by Chinese requests to deliver “150 FC-1 Fierce Dragon fighter 
planes, equipped with Russian RD-93 engines, to Pakistan.”266  Due to the financial 
ramifications concerning earlier deals with China, Vladimir Putin personally gave the 
Chinese permission to go ahead with the deal in April.267  Overall, negative trends in 
Sino-Russian MTC were beginning to exacerbate tensions in the relationship that had 
been present since the mid-1990s in some form.  During the next year, the situation 
would remain the same. 
In 2008, Russian arms exports to China remained at the previous year’s level of 
$1.2 billion.268  It was also the first year since 1993 that the PRC did not place any 
procurement orders with the RF.269  For Russia, almost a decade of defense reforms 
produced little in the way of progress.  The Russian defense-industrial complex remained 
backward, inefficient, and focused on producing items for export that contradicted 
domestic attempts at defense reform policy.  It also constrained the development of 
Russian military strategies around military equipment produced for sale on the 
international market.  This exacerbated the procurement imbalance that still existed 
between domestic and international purchases.270 In China, its defense-industrial sector 
was now able to produce a portion of its own defense needs under license or through 
reverse engineering.  It still remained deficient in several areas that Russian advanced 
technology could assist with if made available for purchase.  Overall, Russian fears still 
negated this possibility and Russian exports levels continued to drop in 2009. 
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Russian exports to China dropped by over 60 percent again in 2009.  They 
finished at around $400 million.271  This was a significant trend because Russian arms 
sales had averaged “between $1 billion to $1.5 billion per year on average over the 
previous decade.”272  Richard Weitz writes, “The drop in Chinese weapons purchases of 
complete weapons systems was particularly acute during the last three years.”273  This 
fact indicates a Chinese shift to the acquisition of advanced military technologies from 
other sources in order to meet its needs.  It was also significant because public Chinese 
military expenditures continued to increase to support its modernization drive.   
In addition, the Chinese only negotiated one procurement deal with the RF to 
supply 122 new AL-31FN turbofan engines for its J-10 fighter program in 2009.  It was 
worth approximately $500 million.  With the IL-76 and 78 procurement deals unfulfilled 
and in an indeterminate state, one new procurement deal set for the future, and only a few 
S-300 SAM batteries left to deliver, Sino-Russian MTC had reached a significantly low 
level as the end of the decade approached. 
Overall, the second half of the decade saw a continuation of the high levels of 
Sino‐Russian arms sales during  the  first  two years.   The seeds of discord  that had 
been planted in the 1990s began to surface in 2006 with the first negative trend in 
the  relationship  occurring  in  2007.    As  the  end  of  the  decade  approached,  Sino‐
Russian MTC dropped off significantly.   By the close of 2009, it had become obvious 
that the 1992 Sino-Russian framework for MTC had run its course.  
C. TRENDS AND ISSUES 
Sino-Russian military cooperation has existed in some form dating back to the 
early twentieth century.  Like most other aspects of this historical relationship, is has 
been characterized by ups and downs just as relations have vacillated between 
honeymoon periods and times of near-war.  The most recent manifestation of Sino-
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Russian military cooperation has served both states needs for more than fifteen years.  
MTC proved a lucrative enterprise for the Russians for a long time and helped it to 
survive its post-Cold War economic woes during the 1990s.  In China, MTC allowed the 
PRC to pursue modernization policies that were domestically and economically 
advantageous as well as conducive to the long-term goals for its armed forces and its 
defense-industrial sector.  However, neither of these cases is true anymore and MTC, as 
formulated in its 1992 framework, has run its course.  It now has become unable to 
provide either side with the structure necessary to foster sustainment during the next five 
to ten years.  As regards military sales and exchanges, both China and Russia will need to 
adjust to the new realities of their domestic and international situations in order to find a 
solution.  It is clear that they will need a new framework if military cooperation in sales 
and technology is going to occur in the future; and this will involve hard choices on both 
sides. 
For Russia, three major decisions lay ahead.  First, it has to realize that China has 
made rapid advancements within its defense-industrial sector.  They are now able to 
produce several types of advanced weapons systems.  This relatively new dynamic has 
significantly reduced Chinese demand for late-era Soviet, or limited high-end military 
technology.  In response to this, Russian policymakers need to decide which foreign 
policy consideration is the most important in deciding a new MTC strategy.  It is a choice 
among long-term regional balance of power considerations, prospects of raising Western 
concerns in the international community, and the prospect of revamping a bilateral arms 
trade framework to be once again financially lucrative and domestically vital to the 
RF.274   
The precarious state of Russia’s defense-industrial sector will weigh heavily into 
the RF’s MTC-related foreign policy considerations.   Without Chinese arms purchases, it 
will be left with India as its only major client-state.  This will leave the Russian defense-
industrial sector increasingly vulnerable to Indian demands.  For example, “If India 
imports fewer weapons, and if the anticipated compensatory growth of new markets for 
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Russian military exports fails to occur,” the Russian defense-industrial complex could 
approach the near-collapse state of the 1990s or worse.275  Overall, a coherent foreign 
policy decision concerning the adoption of a viable MTC strategy is the linchpin that 
overrides all other Russian concerns.   
Second, Russia needs to decide whether to overcome its fears concerning the 
provision of advanced military technology to the Chinese.  The PRC already has become 
a global competitor in the developing world arms market and will continue to be 
regardless of whether the RF provides advanced military technology or not in the future.  
China has become adept at reverse engineering, cloning, and now has the economic 
means to produce arms at cheaper prices.  The majority of Russian apprehensions about 
technology proliferation might be alleviated through the implementation of a more robust 
and comprehensive joint partnership policy within a new MTC framework.  China would 
gain access to advanced technology, and China sales would no longer lock the Russian 
defense-industrial sector inside of its export-centric production dilemma.  This may also 
allow for more Russian oversight than would be possible with the utilization of licensing 
procedures alone.  In order to make such a decision, Russian policy makers would need 
to realize that China is here to stay as an arms competitor with a vibrant economic 
environment and dramatic growth in the sophistication and proficiency of its own 
(Chinese) defense industries.  RF defense industries may actually gain in the long term 
from more integration and cooperation in this manner.   
The third major decision involves the realization for Russian policy makers that 
defense-industrial reform is essential if the RF wishes to remain viable as a global 
weapons supplier to China, or anyone else over the long term.  Tiananmen Square 
occurred at time when Russia’s defense sector was near a point of collapse.  Since then, it 
has reaped the benefits of this unfortunate event by offering an alternative for China due 
to its inability to purchase advanced military technology from the West.  As the 2005 
near-decision to lift the arms embargo indicated in the EU, change is coming sooner 
rather than later.   
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It is uncertain how long the RF will be able to continue to operate under current 
international conditions, but it is clear that defense reform needs to occur on a broad scale 
at some point or Russia’s defense industry will not be able to react to or compete in a 
changing market.  If the RF wants to ensure the long-term survival of its defense-
industrial sector, it needs to eradicate the immense inefficiencies, rampant corruption, and 
myriad structural problems that continue to plaque its reform efforts.  These issues have 
remained unchanged due to years of lucrative arms sales to India and China.  Those sales 
provided billions of dollars in revenue that have allowed the Russian defense-industrial 
sector to “live off the fat” of past successes.  However, those days are waning.   Once 
these reform issues are finally rectified, the RF will still need to foster a commercial 
environment that promotes innovation.276   
Overall, any decision to implement reform measures such as these will be a 
challenging process.  Nonetheless, the RF will have to adopt reform measures in some 
form or another if it wants to be prepared for the eventual return of Western competition 
and have the ability to confront the reality of the PRC as a global arms competitor from 
now on. 
In China, two dynamics affect its desire to facilitate a new MTC framework.  
First, as long as Western arms embargoes or restrictions remain in place, the PRC 
remains limited in its ability to acquire the most sophisticated military technologies from 
anywhere but the RF.  For example, in 2009, it imported arms and military equipment 
from France, Germany, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the Ukraine totaling over 
$1.9 billion.277  All of these purchases fulfilled niche needs, and were of better quality 
than the Soviet-era equivalent, but they did not provide the PRC with advanced military 
technology of any significant value. 
Second, but related  to the first dynamic, the Chinese defense-industrial complex 
will remain deficient in several critical areas, as long as Western arms restrictions remain 
in place, and as long as the RF refuses to sell the PRC the advanced technologies that 
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could make up for these shortfalls.  Some of these areas include low radar cross-section 
and stealth development, the development of integrated maritime air defense and anti-
submarine warfare systems on par with the Western systems.  Others include the ability 
to “overcome the technological obstacles necessary to build a nuclear-powered aircraft 
carrier” or any other type of carrier with the ability for sustained power projection.278  
Absent foreign assistance, the development of critical technologies such as these takes 
decades of research and trial and error.  It also takes years of operational development to 
build up effective doctrine and the procedures necessary to integrate these systems into 
the force effectively.  Without the ability to make generational shifts through the foreign 
procurement of the technology that it desires, Chinese military modernization initiatives 
will be slowed in many ways.   
In the end, Russia and China both need each other for different reasons under 
current international conditions.  In the RF’s case, those conditions are subject to change 
on short notice.  Either way, however, it is safe to say that China will fare much better 
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V. CONCLUSION 
A. SUMMARY 
China and Russia’s relations share a complex history.  They have traversed the 
full spectrum of relations since the formation of the modern state system.  Early in the 
Cold War, China and the Soviet Union shared a period of solidarity that culminated in 
alliance, but morphed into hostility by the 1960s with the risk of war and decades of tense 
coexistence.  In the 1980s, leading up to the end of the Cold War, Beijing and Moscow 
began to plant the seeds of rapprochement and relations eventually grew into the strategic 
partnership that is touted today by both sides.  
Several analysts contend that the Sino-Russian relationship is stronger than it has 
been at any other point in history.279  While this may be true in most regards, the 
historical analysis presented in this thesis has demonstrated that several points of 
contention, rooted in history, remain salient in today’s relationship.  Each of the three 
aspects analyzed in this thesis has its own historical narrative.  Each helps to explain two 
pertinent aspects in the Sino-Russian relationship.  First, the historical narratives assist in 
deciphering how the Sino-Russian relationship has evolved into its contemporary state.  
Second, these narratives demonstrate that the points of convergence and divergence 
elucidated in each chapter have a role or an effect in shaping the long-term prospects for 
the Sino-Russian strategic partnership.   
In the RFE, historical divergences over the region’s rightful owner have given 
both sides a reason for apprehension due to the current demographic and economic 
imbalances.  These anxieties, as well as pervasive feelings of Sino-phobia among much 
of the local population, have been exacerbated on the Russian side by Moscow’s 
indifference or inaction, combined with its inability to develop the RFE region to even a 
fraction of its potential.  For China, RFE legacy tensions are another tangible reminder of  
 
 
279 Rumer, “Mind the Gap,” 71. 
 80
its “century of humiliation” and have the potential, in the extreme, to fuel vociferous 
Chinese nationalist outcries that could destabilize regional development with significant 
and negative effects.  
The formation and development of the SCO has begun to redefine geopolitical 
and economic relationships in Central Asia that had been historically favorable to Russia.  
The current state of SCO competition, mixed with cooperation, is an admission by both 
China and Russia that the “tacit agreement” that defined their historical relationship in 
the region is changing.  For Russia, its receding power in the region is another reminder 
of its forced retrenchment in the post-Cold War era and of the growing asymmetry in its 
Central Asian and international status vis-à-vis China.  For China, it is a region where its 
influence is growing and another indicator of its growth as a major power beyond East 
Asia. 
Sino-Russian MTC, so lucrative for both sides until the mid-2000s, has reached 
the culmination point as well.  Its framework needs to change if China and Russia wish it 
to continue in any meaningful fashion.  Moscow will have to agree to the Beijing’s 
procurement of more advance post-Soviet era technology, and somehow leverage this 
development to modernize its (Russia’s) outdated defense-industrial base.  One thing is 
for sure, the Russian defense-industrial base needs Chinese business if it is going to 
circumvent future crises or the outright collapse of its entire defense industry.  For its 
part, Beijing must be willing to respect Russian intellectual property rights, diverge from 
its current model for military technological procurement from the Russians, and provide 
more transparency as it regards implementation of this technology into its armed forces.  
Without the continued procurement of Russian military technology, the PRC, under the 
current international conditions, will be challenged to sustain its military modernization 
programs at the current pace.    
Overall, these issues present three significant areas among several that will have a 
hand in shaping the prospects for the Sino-Russian strategic partnership in the short, 
medium, and long term.   
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B. SHORT- AND MEDIUM-TERM PROSPECTS 
Over the next five to ten years, Sino-Russian relations will continue to remain 
relatively positive despite the underlying tensions inherent in their association.280  The 
relationship will also remain centered on tangible benefits and pragmatism.  As Rajan 
Menon states:  
The current strategic partnership is rather different than the comity of the 
1950s.  The latter was based on a high degree of ideological kinship.  But 
no matter how similarly the two countries wee the world today, doctrine is 
not the glue that binds them; it is pragmatism pure and simple.  While the 
partnership is partly attributable to a common opposition to Pax 
Americana and the attendant unipolar international system, it represents an 
accretion of achievements that resulted from the determination of Chinese 
and Russian leaders to put an end to decades of enmity, quite independent 
of the state of their relationships with Washington.  It has, in other words, 
a logic and dynamic all its own.281 
This is an important distinction because the Sino-Soviet split is often looked upon as a 
reference point for determining the future potential of the Sino-Russian relationship in its 
current form.  However, each of these relationships was predicated on a different 
foundation, which makes the determinants for its future inherently different.  History, in 
this case, merely shows how quickly erosion in a bilateral alliance can facilitate 
acrimonious consequences.   
Unfortunately, these factors are true for all state-to-state relations.  The nature of 
the Sino-Russian relationship, as Lo assesses it, is “surprisingly normal” and will be open 
to the same domestic and international forces inherent to all bilateral relationships over 
the next five to ten years.282  In the meantime, both states will continue to perceive more 
benefits than problems in maintaining the relationship in its current iteration during this 
timeframe. 
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For China, the current benefits of its strategic relationship with Russia include 
access to arms, strategic energy resources, and cooperation on the issues defined in the 
“three evils.”283  The PRC will continue to exercise restraint in dealing with Russian 
perceptions of its place in the international system and its effects on relations with China 
and the West.  Beijing will strive to keep its disagreements with Russia private, as long as 
it continues to get most of what it desires from the relationship as it exists today. 
For Moscow, the strategic partnership gives it the means to support its obsolete 
and inefficient defense-industrial base, sustain several portions of the RFEs population 
through legal and illicit trade, and it gives it a partner who shares apprehensions about the 
United States’ intentions in the greater Asian region.  In addition, it provides Moscow 
with the ability to “enhance its leverage with the U.S. and Europe due to its propensity to 
lean to the West.”284  These facets of the partnership will entice Russia to maintain the 
relationship under its current auspices.   
Overall, the benefits of the relationship still provide a significant foundation of 
interests for both states.  In the short- and medium-term, they outweigh the potential for 
the points of contention discussed earlier to derail Sino-Russian relations.  The 
relationship is likely to continue its status quo existence and its utility for both sides.  The 
aspects, as considered earlier in this thesis, do not suggest the Sino-Russian relationship 
will develop into a military alliance or devolve into a 1950s-era split with the potential 
for war in the short-and medium-term.  In both cases, the current foundation of 
contemporary relations makes either of these developments highly unlikely.   
C. LONG-TERM PROSPECTS 
Dealing with long-term considerations for the Sino-Russian relationship in the 
context of this topic might best be regarded as what Nadkarni terms “scholarly 
speculation.”285  It is stimulating and entertaining, but analytical rigor is hampered by a 
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lack of clarity in pertinent variables and factors yet unknown.  However, the issues may 
be analyzed with some contemporary factors that suggest trends in the direction of the 
future relationship, at least in the context of this thesis.  This section will outline each 
facet and consider its potential effect on the long-term future of Sino-Russian relations.   
There is no doubt that China is becoming the “dominant force” in many aspects of 
the bilateral relationship.286  Several factors on the Russian side have continued to 
exacerbate this growing gap in power.  Eugene Rumer states that “there is an economic, 
military, and demographic gap between today’s Russia and the other major actors in 
Eurasian geopolitics.”287  For now, Moscow seems to ignore these mounting gaps and 
appears guided by seemingly incoherent policies replete with ambitions that do not match 
its capabilities.288  The legacy of the Soviet Union has left the RF with a sense of 
strategic entitlement, xenophobia to most non-Russian ethnicities, and anti-globalist 
views on conducting foreign policy in the twenty-first century.289  In addition, much of 
the infrastructure in the RFE, as well as in many other regions, is decrepit and the 
industrial base of much, if not most, of the economy is obsolete.  These factors, combined 
with the detrimental effects of rampant corruption throughout every Russian private and 
government entity, severely hamper the long-term prospects for Russia as a partner with 
China as well as with the region.290   
Economically, the RF is in danger of developing into a “client-patron” 
relationship with the PRC.  This is a distinct possibility if Moscow continues to ignore 
the implications of detrimental Soviet legacies and its current perception gap over the 
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next ten years and beyond.291  This would be a dramatic setback for a country that has 
such economic potential.  For example, the CIA World Fact Book state that: 
In 2009 Russia was the world's largest exporter of natural gas, the second 
largest exporter of oil, and the third largest exporter of steel and primary 
aluminum - and other less competitive heavy industries that remain 
dependent on the Russian domestic market. This reliance on commodity 
exports makes Russia vulnerable to boom and bust cycles that follow the 
highly volatile swings in global commodity prices.292 
In addition to commodity prices, this reliance also makes Russia vulnerable to China and 
its long-term interests. Russia needs to develop domestic support industries that 
complement and enhance its ability to compete in world markets.  If not, Russia is in 
great danger of becoming a state that is cursed by resources and locked into a role in the 
future international economy that is not commensurate with its current perceptions.   
In 2008, Lo stated that “Russia would become less important to China as time 
goes on.”  Russian world views, all shaped by the factors mentioned earlier, have already 
facilitated the gradual development of this trend.  Russia has time over the next five to 
ten years to change its current economic and anti-globalist policies and attempt to 
facilitate more robust cooperation with China in the areas that will aid in a sustained 
resurgence built for the long term.  Beyond that, it is likely that the RF will become a 
marginally important client state of the PRC with some continued value as a raw material 
exporter and a provider of military niche technology.  The latter aspect may become 
irrelevant by this point in time if the international environment becomes more conducive 
to Chinese imports of Western military technology. 
Militarily, the RF will always remain relevant as a military power due to its vast 
nuclear arsenal.  In conventional terms, the Russian armed forces are still trying to 
recover from episodes of near-collapse in the 1990s and the dramatic shortfalls in forces 
demonstrated by the war in the Republic of Georgia in 2008.  In response to these issues, 
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University of Kentucky Press, 2010), 7–8. 
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the RF initiated radical and wide-spread reforms for its conventional forces.293  The RF’s 
intent with these reforms is to re-establish professionalization and introduce a more 
flexible force structure along western lines during the next decade.  At the same time, 
Chinese military modernization continues to make the PLA a more credible and 
formidable force that is likely to be on par with, or even exceed the Russian armed forces 
power projection capabilities in ten years.  In addition, the Chinese currently enjoy a 
decisive financial advantage in the pursuit of their modernization goals.  
Over the long term, Russia will have to overcome myriad problems in its armed 
forces and its defense-industrial sector if it has any hope of implementing any long-term 
reform that is successful.  These factors, as well as the unpredictable international 
situation regarding Chinese military technological procurement, make long-term 
predictions about Chinese armed forces vis-à-vis the Russian Federation extremely 
difficult.  One thing is certain under the current circumstances: Chinese long-term 
prospects are much more positive than the Russian outlook. 
As discussed in the section on the RFE, Russia’s demographic decline regionally 
may have a dramatic effect on the long-term prospects for the Sino-Russian relationship. 
The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), in a 2001 report on global demographic trends 
states that “for Russia, an unhealthy declining population—especially among working-
age males—could impact economic growth and domestic stability, vulnerabilities that 
internal political groups or other states, near and far, could seek to exploit.”294  Due to 
China’s immense land border with Russia and the history of contention over territories in 
the RFE, it is possible that the factors listed above could have a significant negative 
impact on Sino-Russian relations over the long term.   
In addition, James Bellacqua observes, “China is the world’s most populous 
nation and is still growing, while Russia’s population is shrinking at an alarming rate of 
 
293 See John Chipman, The Military Balance 2009 Press Statement (accessed August 16, 2010); 
available from http://www.iiss.org/publications/military-balance/the-military-balance-2009/military-
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700,000 people a year.”295  Demographic shifts in population are already shaping the 
local population’s perceptions about long-term Chinese intentions in the RFE and the 
overall economic prospects for the region.  China will continue to be viewed as a long-
term threat in the RFE.  It is plausible that this perception could combine with history to 
become a self-fulfilling prophecy beyond the next ten years, if Russia does not begin to 
adopt a coherent policy of development to fix the problem and assuage the fears of the 
local population. 
All of these issues have the long-term potential to create an imbalance in relations 
that could eventually lead to significant strategic tension.296  Russia’s perception gap and 
its decreasing relevance to China in its calculations have the potential to facilitate the 
emergence of this state of relations over the long term.  In Russia, it will continue to 
aspire for a place in the twenty-first century international system that is not in keeping 
with its overall power under current conditions.  For China, its continued rise into a 
global power is not a question of if but when.  Eventually, because of these realities for 
both states, tension will emerge that will put both countries at odds over the direction of 
global affairs beyond ten years.  It is one of many possible outcomes, but entirely 
plausible under the current circumstances.     
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